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A NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL-SEMIOTIC MODEL 
OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCES 
Wesley J. Wildman & Leslie A. Brothers 
1.1 Goal 
The goal of this essay is to present a richly textured interpretation of a large tract of 
the territory of religious experiences that we shall call experiences ofultimacy, a 
name that will be explained below. We develop this interpretation in two phases. 
First, we describe these religious experiences as objectively as possible, combining 
the descriptive precision of phenomenology informed by the neurosciences with a 
number of more obviously perspectival insights from psychology, sociology, 
theology, and ethics. Our hope is that the resulting taxonomy is compelling enough 
to suggest criteria for the plausibility of constructive efforts in theology and 
philosophy that depend upon an interpretation of religious experiences, includmg 
those in this book that attempt to speak of divine action in relation to human 
consciousness. 
Second, we make two constructive ventures on the basis of this description. In 
the first, inspired by existing social processes used to iden@ authentic religious 
experiences, we describe a procedure whereby genuine experiences of ultimacy can 
be distinguished from mere claims to such experiences. This brings such experiences 
into the domain of public, scienMic discussion as much as they can be, which is a 
great advantage from the point of view of encouraging more mainstream discussion 
of them by scientists and other intellectuals. The other constructive venture is a 
theory about the causation of ultimacy experiences. This is our attempt to evaluate 
claims made concerning the ultimate cause and value of experiences of ultimacy. The 
modeling procedure we adopt makes use of semiotic theory to plot not causal 
interactions themselves but rather their traces in the form of sign transformations- 
all terms that will be explained in detail later. In the language of semiotic theory, 
these causal traces take the form of richly intense sign transformations. This proposal 
keeps ontological presuppositions to a minimum by focusing on causal traces rather 
than on the nature of the cause itself. Nevertheless, it does offer a religiously or 
spiritually positive way of interpreting authentic ultimacy experiences, and at the end 
we offer a suggestion about the nature of the ultimate reality that might leave such 
causal traces. 
1.2 Motivation 
The motivation for the task we undertake here is primarily the intuition that religious 
experiences are important elements of human life, worthy ofrespectful and energetic 
interdisciplinary study. A word of explanation is required, however, because this 
intuition may seem obscure or trivial, depending on one's point of view. On the one 
hand, when religion is understood in the tradition of Emile Durkheim as the 
expression and codification of the most important cosmological and ethical 
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commitments of a group,] individual experiences may seem irrelevant to the account 
of religion proffered. Yet appearances in thls case are misleading: as Durkheim 
himself understood, without personal religious experience in some form, whether 
aberrant or not, the cohesiveness of religious groups and the motivation for 
underlying cosmological and ethlcal commitments remain unintelligible features of 
human life. On the other hand, a religious interpretation of human life in terms of 
categories such as sin and salvation, suffering and liberation, will be so apt to 
emphasize individuals that religious experiences will seem inevitably preeminent. 
The danger here, however, is that the complexity and diversity of religious 
experience and practice will be reduced to fit what a particular religion's belief 
structure can comprehend. Juxtaposing these two points of view leads to the 
conclusion that religious experiences are important in any analysis of human Me and 
that many different points of view need to be integrated in order to achieve a 
properly balanced theory. 
This assessment of the general importance of the study of religious experiences 
needs to be related to several other motivating factors. First, the increasing obscurity 
of scriptural, ritual, and theological language about divine action in recent centuries 
has drawn attention to the individual person as a possible locus for the action of God 
or gods. In fact, to the extent that divine action in the natural order has been eclipsed 
by scientific accounts of nature, divine action directly in relation to human 
consciousness can have the sigtuficance of a last resort for making sense of such 
language. This adds a sense of urgency to the investigation of religious experiences, 
especially among those who have had them. 
Second, the neurosciences have largely succeeded through their analyses of brain 
structure and function in portraying that which is distinctively human as continuous 
with regularities and forms of complexity observed throughout nature. This generally 
accepted conclusion about human beings reconfigures the whole question of 
religious experiences by proposing explanations for them that are independent ofthe 
assumption that they are experiences of anyhng properly called a religious object2 
The rise of the neurosciences does not make this reductionistic challenge philosophi- 
cally different in kind than it was previously, but it does demand that theories of 
religious experiences should attend to the neurosciences. 
T h d ,  although neuroscientific accounts have focused on isolated brains, there 
is growing interest in the social capacities of the human brain. This research area 
suggests an approach to theorizing about religious experiences that exploits fi-uithl 
links between isolated-brain neuroscience and the various forms of communal 
wisdom that traditionally have been vital to the understanding of religious 
experiences. 
1.3 Limitations 
So much for motivation. Our goal must also be qualified by several practical 
considerations. First, research into the nature of religious experiences is siill in its 
' See Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of h e  Religious Life, tr. from the French 
by Joseph Ward Swain (New York: The Free Press; London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 
1915). 
For an early and notable example of such a theory, see Julian Jaynes, The Origin of 
Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind (Boston: Houghton Mimin 
Company, 1976). 
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infancy in most respects. In particular, neuroscience-including cognitive 
neuroscience, the subdiscipline most pertinent to our current project-lacks a central 
theory capable of organizing the fiagments of knowledge that we have. The field at 
present is a collection of part-concepts whose composition sh& with each new 
wave of experiments and interpretations.3 Detailed neurobiological accounts are 
therefore premature: we can only make tentative suggestions, and nothmg will get 
done without a sense of adventure. The same must be said of the phenomenology of 
religious experience. Disciplined and properly informed cross-cultural comparison 
has barely begun, and the means to determine agreement and disagreement between 
culturally bound descriptions of religious experiences remain obscu~-e.4 
Second, a cornerstone of our position is its neutrality. In the descriptive phase of 
the essay, we assume neither the reality nor the nonreality of that which is taken to 
be the object of an experience of ultimacy, and we take for granted neither the 
efficacy of belief in that object nor even the coherence of the idea. Subsequently, in 
the constructive phase of the essay, while we shall assume that ultimate reality leaves 
causal traces of a particular kmd, we assume nothing about the nature of this ultimate 
reality; it could be anythmg fiom ontological emptiness to a supernatural God, fiom 
the self-groundmg mystery of Godless nature to the wondrous divinity beyond being 
and not-being of the great mystics. We shall explain how h s  neutrality is possible 
below but state the two associated limitations here. First, there are some theological 
and existential-philosophical perspectives fiom which h s  posture of maximizing 
neutrality necessarily dooms our project because, it is held, ultimacy can only be 
discussed fairly if its reality and efficacy are fully accepted. We take this dictum 
seriously because it is the view of so many theologically serious viewpoints in the 
world's religions. We think, however, that it can only be evaluated empirically on 
the basis of the success or failure of projects that set it aside, as ours does. Second, 
our attempt to be as ontologically neutral as possible in the constructive phase of the 
essay avoids a self-defeating reductionism by making use of a philosophical 
framework drawn fiom semiotic theory (the theory of signs).' Some philosophical 
complexity is the inevitable result, but we try as much as possible to deal with the 
philosophical details in footnotes and only introduce them as they are needed toward 
the end of the essay. 
' A  similar analysis holds good, we think, for cognitive science. This is as true now-see 
Fraser Watts's essay in this volume--as it was a quarter of a century ago; see Allen Newell, 
"You Can't Play 20 Questions with Nature and Win: Projective Comments on the Papers of 
This Symposium," in Visual Information Processing: Proceedings of the Eighth Annual 
Carnegie Symposium on Cognihon, William Chase, ed. (New York: Academic Press, 1973), 
283-308. 
One component of this challenge is to develop cross-cultural comparative religious 
categories and the means to criticize and improve them. This is the goal of a series of volumes 
forthcoming from the Cross-Cultural Comparative Religious Ideas Project, directed by Robert 
CummingsNeville, Peter L. Berger, and John H. Berthrong, to be published by SUNY Press. 
The first of these, The Human Condition, is scheduled for publication in 1999. Subsequent 
volumes, to appear in 2000, are Ultimate Realities and Religious Truth. 
' The elements of semiotic theory that we use are drawn especially from the pragmatic 
philosophy of the North American philosopher Charles Saunders Peirce. whose 
&eopm*matism (the apt designation of Robert ~ . ~ e v i l l e )  is to be distinguished sharply from 
the neopragmatism of Richard Rorty. See section 7, below, for a more detailed account of the 
salient points. 
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so it is hard to know whether we are describing the same,experiences even when we 
use identical descriptions w i t h  a single social-lingustic context. These consider- 
ations draw our attention to the hermeneutical circle connecting social-linguistic 
context and individual descriptions of ultimacy experiences." While some might 
welcome relativism of descriptions as a way of protecting religious experience from 
scientific scrutiny, we treat it as a problem to be overcome. Our efforts can only be 
useful for questions about the causes and value of ultimacy experiences (the focus 
of section 7) if there is a way to determine, at least approximately, when and what 
sort of ultimacy experiences occur (the focus of section 6)." 
Many attempts to define religious experiences have been made. We think most 
of them are flawed but we have found their insights quite helpful, as the following 
examples show. First, some definitions rely on phenomenological characteristics to 
circumvent the problem that people's descriptions are unreliable (for example, 
William James). Ths is wise, and we think that a sense of oneness with the divine 
and a sense of awe are good phenomenological markers for some experiences in our 
target group. Yet we cannot rely solely on a phenomenological approach to defining 
our target group because phenomenological reports are themselves subject to herme- 
neutical ddticulties.l2 Second, some definitions focus on the irrational and usually 
spectacular elements of religious experience (for example, Rudolf Otto). This is 
useful because the phenomenological markers are easy to iden@ in those cases. 
However, we also want to include the more rational experiences surrounding the 
forming and changing of convictions and behaviors. Particularly interesting for 
understandmg the causes and value of religious experiences are the sometimes 
mundane-seeming, sometimes spectacular experiences of conversion and character 
transformation, whch typically involve both irrational and rational elements. Third, 
definitions focusing on individual experiences make obvious sense, and yet the role 
of the social-linguistic context is easy to overlook. We wish to pay close attention to 
the way social-linguistic contexts condition an individual's description of ultimacy 
experiences, for whch a rich resource is the refined judgment of religious groups 
concerning the authenticity of claims to conversion and character transformation. 
Fourth, most definitions focus on what people are willing to call religious experi- 
ences, but we also want to include in our target group episodes in the lives of non- 
religious people who do not have the categoIy "religious experience" at their 
'O This hermeneutical circle can be described by defining the social-linguistic context as the 
domain (1) in which experiences of ultimacy are described and described, (2) in relation to 
which people form their expectations about experiences of ultimacy, (3) under the influence 
of which people learn how to use the words that will later help them describe their own 
ultimacy experiences, and (4) by means of which people's descriptions of their experiences 
are assessed, corrected, and regulated. 
" It is important to note that detecting authentic ultimacy experiences is not merely an 
academic instinct imposed on religious practice. It is a pressing concern for religious groups 
as well, many of which have developed sophisticated methods of discernment to help make 
the judgments they want to make about the authenticity of religious experiences. 
l1 The difficulties of too narrowly phenomenological an approach to delimiting the target 
group are as follows. First, this approach is precarious through its exclusive dependence on 
people's descriptions of religious experiences; phenomenological description requires skills 
in repohng that most people do not have. Second, the exclusively phenomenological approach 
to definition tends toward too narrow a definition, de-emphasizing many important features 
of religious experiences, especially those surrounding conversion and character 
transformation. 
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disposal. Nonreligious people sometimes describe their experiences in ways that 
lead religious people to call them "religious  experience^."'^ Moreover, such 
experiences sometimes appear to be potent forces for character transformation. We 
conjecture that people's self-identification as religious or nonreligious is not an 
overriding consideration in determining the causes and value of religious experi- 
ences. 
Having pondered existing defuutions of religious experience, we are forced to 
concede that a precise definition of ultimacy experiences is probably out of the 
question. Nevertheless, there are several sorts of markers for ultimacy experiences: 
people's descriptions within social-linguistic contexts, phenomenological 
characteristics, the judgment of experts in religious discernment or of psychologists, 
the wisdom of generations encoded in theological and ethical traditions, and even 
neural signatures. These markers may not always be in complete harmony, as when 
a phenomenologically spectacular religious conversion is judged inauthentic by a 
religious group or when a person not ~ l i a t e d  with any religious group refuses to 
describe as religious an experience that utterly transforms hls or her character. 
Nevertheless, such markers can still be used to evaluate putative experiences of 
ultimacy. In section 6 we shall give some examples of how this evaluation process 
might work. The point to be made here is that establishing a process of evaluating 
putative ultimacy experiences is equivalent to offering a dynamic definition for our 
model's target group of religious experiences. The resulting definition is dynmc in 
two senses. On the one hand, applying the definition in any given instance requires 
running through the process of evaluating the various markers for ultimacy 
experiences and remembering at the same time that there is a complex taxonomy of 
such experiences whereby Merent types are associated with different sets of 
phenomenal characteristics. On the other hand, the defuution is not dyadic, excluding 
some experiences and including others. It is more llke a set of targets, with the 
ultimacy experiences closest to the bull's eye for each type being those with the 
strongest agreement among markers. 
Diagram 1 (see Appendix B) illustrates both the relation between ultimacy 
experiences and other experiences and the complex process of defuution that we 
need to develop. The various considerations relevant to the description of ultimacy 
experiences are introduced in the next section and discussed in detail in sections 2-5. 
How all of h s  descriptive work contributes to a dynamic process of definition is 
described in section 6. The causal model of ultimacy experiences developed in 
section 7 is built on h s  descriptive foundation. As complicated as they are, we think 
experiences of ultimacy are delineated well enough for us to proceed with hying to 
describe them. 
1.5 Components: Four Perspectives on UMmacy Experiences 
We gather the considerations we use for the description of ultimacy experiences into 
four groups. Two-the phenomenological and the social-psychological-refine our 
understanding of the fundamental dialectic between individuals and social-linguistic 
contexts; it is within that dialectical tension that the meanings of descriptions of 
ultimacy experiences are established. The other two components are less closely 
bound to the social-linguistic systems. One is neurology, which may in the future 
" There are accounts of this sort in William James, Varieties of Religious Experience: A 
Study in Human Nature (New York: Longmans, Green, 1902). 
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contribute criteria to the task of assessing ultimacy experiences. The other is 
theological or ethical convictions that stipulate criteria for authenticity of claims to 
experiences ofultimacy in the form of correlations between such experiences and the 
behavior of those that have them. Theology sometimes also ventures to stipulate the 
specific causes of certain kinds of ultimacy experiences. We shall introduce each of 
these four components briefly and then devote the next four sections to a more 
detailed discussion of each. 
First, phenomenological description of ultimacy experiences furnishes a h c k  
description of their quality and relations to other events and  experience^.'^ 
Phenomenological description depends on intensifying a linguistic system with new 
vocabulary and meanings, which allows experiences to be described with great 
nuance and precision. We may h n k  of Rudolf Otto's phenomenology of numinous 
experiences-(see section 2.2). Or we may think of Ssren Kierkegaard's three-staged 
phenomenology of religious conversion and character transformation from the 
aesthetic to the ehcal  to the religious (see section 2.5). These and other phenome- 
nologies, we take it, often induce strong feelings of recognition in those who read 
them; they often succeed in evoking assent when the reader is sensitive enough to 
grasp the enhancements of the linguistic system that the phenomenologist is trying 
to establish. 
The second set of considerations derives fiom neurology. It is questionable 
whether brain states and processes can be correlated with personal descriptions of 
purported experiences of ultimacy at the present time, or ever. To the extent that 
correlations become possible, however, they would promise objective access to 
internal experiences through functional imaging and other measurements of brain 
activity, even as phenomenology promises objective access to internal experiences 
through disciplined cultivation of descriptive expertise. Though both neurological 
scans and phenomenological analyses are somewhat removed kern the day-to-day 
use of linguistic systems to describe ultimacy experiences, both are relevant factors 
in the hermeneutical mix and presumably neurological considerations will become 
more important with time, even at the level of the individual religious person's self- 
con~ciousness.'~ Furthermore, neurological correlates could conceivably lead to 
criteria for "false positives" with the potential to weigh against the authenticity of 
We must provisionally set aside the philosophical commitment ofphenomenologists such 
as Edmund ~ u s s e r l  to thk possibility of achieGing public, objectivedescriptions zinternal 
conscious states through his phenomenological method. Ifthis Husserlian claim is correct then 
the problem of other hinds'is essentially overcome and there is powerful evidence both for 
the autonomy of experiences of ultimacy and for the capacity of experiences of ultimacy to 
amend descriptions of them; it is not a matter of "hermeneutics all the way down" after all. 
Ofcourse, even this result would say nothing about the cause of ultimacy experiences (though 
some phenomenologists would insist that this too could be determined), for their shared 
features may derive from the biological givenness of human beings or similar factors. But we 
cannot evaluate even this moderate claim adequately here and so must proceed by thinking 
of phenomenology as a disciplined development of part of a social-linguistic network so that 
that network becomes dense and sensitive enough to permit a properly trained person to make 
subtle discriminations among his or her experiences. 
I' This suggests a humorous image. Instead of demanding that group members handle 
poisonous snakes, speak in tongues, or give an enlightened answer to a koan, some religious 
groups might require specific sorts of brain activity as measured by functional imaging 
equipment. fMRI equipment in place of confessionals? While humorous, scenarios like this 
are surely not absurd or unlikely in the long term. 
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ultimacy experiences in spite of personal testimony. By contrast, if experiences of 
ultimacy turn out to be inconsistently realized or widely distributed across brain 
structum and variously expressed in brain processes, then they may have no obvious 
neurological correlates, and neurology would be of correspondingly little use as a 
criterion of authenticity. Of course, the situation is likely to be somewhere between 
these two extremes, but not enough is yet known to be sure how useful the 
neurological criterion will prove to be. And however well it serves as a criterion, it 
is an important element in any theory of ultimacy experiences. 
Third, descriptions of experiences of ultimacy are greatly enriched by experts in 
psychology and sociology. These experts concern themselves less with the thick 
descriptions of experiences of ultimacy and more with the description of typical 
experiences of ultimacy, attending to how they cohere with other aspects of the 
human person by means of categories drawn from psychology, ehcs ,  or spirituality. 
Understanding the processes of emotional and physical development in the typical 
human person, along with common aberrations, casts reports of experiences of 
ultimacy into a helpful light. Similarly, understanding the influences of religious 
groups on individuals allows experts to give nuanced descriptions of the complex 
social interactions within which many ultimacy experiences occur. Many religious 
people have at their disposal a vast database of fust-hand and second-hand stories 
of ultimacy experiences in whch the before and the after of the episode itself expose 
typical patterns of behavior. Of course, exceptions are unsurprising and even 
expected; expert psychoanalysts or religious advisors do not have privileged access 
to the experiences in question. But even exceptions have a kind of plausibility, 
perhaps due to thoroughly systematic ways in whch typical patterns are broken. A 
person's chosen description of experiences of ultimacy and the meaning of that 
description in h s  or her social-linguistic context are profoundly influenced by such 
expert readings of the typical psychological and behavioral accompaniments of 
typical ultimacy experiences. 
The fourth set of considerations is theological in character. Theological theories 
of ultimacy can be sufficiently detailed to permit stipulation of the psychological and 
behavioral correlates of experiences of ultimacy. For example, it is almost 
universally held in theological systems that experiences of ultimacy should transform 
people's character. The experience of samadlu in Buddhist meditation is supposed 
to make a person more caring toward other creatures and the experience of assurance 
in Christian piety is supposed to make a person unaccountably peaceful. These 
theologically-based beliefs are crucial in the operation of both inhvidual spiritual 
direction and corporate discernment processes in religious groups, and we think they 
are also active in diffuse ways, perhaps also more generally ehca l  than specifically 
theological in character, in the secular analogues ofdiscernment such as psychoanal- 
ysis. Of course, we might well say that theories of ultimacy of this lund should not 
count in forming our ideas of how experiences of ultimacy should affect people, but 
h s  would be an overreaction. Theological considerations function as a source of 
suggestions and hints as towhat psychological and behavioral characteristics should 
be expected in the presence of an authentic claim of an experience of ultimacy. From 
h s  point of view, we would be justified in assuming that theological reflection and 
ethical theories over the centuries are well placed to give good hints, informed as 
they are by a wealth of individual and corporate experience. It is not the specifically 
normative character of theological or ethical reflection that makes these hints d, 
therefore, but the long-term functionality of the theological or ethical theories 
themselves in religious and other groups. 
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The taxonomy of ultimacy experiences we develop draws chiefly fiom the 
phenomenological considerations, with crucial support corning fiom the neurologi- 
cally important dstinction between short-term and long-term episodes. Social- 
psychological and theological considerations play especially important roles in the 
process of dstinguishing authentic ultimacy experiences (see section 6). Our model 
of the causation of ultimacy experiences (see section 7) has little h e c t  use for 
phenomenological considerations, focusing instead on those that are neural, social- 
psychological, and theological. 
2 Phenomenological Considerations 
Phenomenology of religion is a diverse collection of partly descriptive, partly 
interpretive approaches to religious phenomena.16 Phenomenological approaches to 
religious experience typically have been oriented to mystical states and conversions, 
which are familiar instances of what we are calling experiences of ultimacy. 
Phenomenologists have dmcted less attention to other kinds of religious experi- 
ences, such as corporate ritual experience and long-term character transformation, 
which can also be instances of ultimacy experiences." In view of thls emphasis, it 
is unsurprising that studies of religious experiences have often taken over distinc- 
tions generated in the phenomenology of religion. As useful as these distinctions may 
prove in some studies, we use phenomenological observations to divide the territory 
of ultimacy experiences in a way more congenial to exploring connections with the 
neurosciences. 
We first distinguish ultimacy experiences on the basis of temporal extension 
because there seems to be a vast phenomenological difference between shorter and 
longer experiences. The phenomenology of dscrete states that can be described as 
ultimacy experiences involves components having to do with sensory awareness, 
l6 For a review, see Eric J. Sharpe, Comparative Religion: A Hisl~ry, 2nd ed. (La Salle: 
Open Court, 1986), especially chap. 10, pp. 220-50. Sharpe is careful to point out that the 
phenomenology of religion is basically an attempt at objective description of religious 
manifestations-places, people, actions, words-that respects the perspective of the religious 
person and that can help in the task of interpreting the nature of religion. It owes little more 
than a few key concepts to the philosophical phenomenology of Husserl, and its vaguely 
defined limits embrace numerous different methodoloaical approaches. Sharoe's 
characterization is accurate so far as it goes, but the various merhodol&~cal approaches hd has 
in mind themselves have a history that Lives on in their use within the ohenomenolow of 
religion. It follows that there is significantly more to the phenomenol~gy of religionY&an 
simply objective description. These methodological approaches usually can be traced back to 
the needs of a discipline to which phenomenological techniques have been applied as a means 
to fuller understanding. Francisco J. Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch identify 
several such methodologydefining allied disciplinary traditions that make extensive use of 
phenomenology: logical-philosophical analysis of human being, meta-analysis of patterns in 
existing theories (usually historical, sociological, or anthropological theories), and analysis of 
techniques used in clinical therapy. See The EmbodiedMind: CognitiveScience and Human 
Experience (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), xvi-xvii. Theorists in the phenomenology of 
religion usually add to the basic goal of objective description the aims of one or more of these 
existing methods of applying phenomenological techniques. 
l7 There are important phenomenological studies of the sacred, including sacred ritual and 
social transactions, which have some overlap with ultimacy experiences. See, for example, 
Gerardus van der Leeuw, Religion in Essence and Manifetation, 2nd ed. with a foreword 
by Ninian Smart (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964; tr. from the 2nd German ed. 
by Hans H. Penner, originally published 1933). 
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sense of self, presences, cognitions, and emotions. The phenomenology of extended 
experiences that can be described a s  ultimacy experiences divides into two classes. 
Dynamic processes of orientation and control help people maintain their relations to 
themselves, groups, and the wider world; these sometimes but not always fall under 
the ambit of ultimacy experiences. Gradual processes of transformation often take 
the form of experiences of ultimacy; these processes involve apparently lasting 
change in behavior, personality, and beliefs. 
2.1 Discrete U h a c y  Experiences: Persinger 
Michael Persinger includes interesting phenomenological characterizations of 
discrete ultimacy experiences in his book, Neuropsychological Bases of God 
Beliefs." We find the book rhetorically unstable, with few llnks to the data he offers 
in support of his conclusions, few appropriate data in the articles to which he refers, 
and problematic patterns of interpreting his data.19 In spite of the book's flaws, 
Persinger's extensive exploration ofconnections between temporal lobe function and 
religious experience leads him to a thoughtful characterization of what he calls God 
experiences, a phenomenological contribution worth quoting at length. 
God Experiences are transient phenomena that are loaded with emotional 
references.. . 
The God Experience exists for a few seconds or minutes at any given time. Multiple 
experiences can occur in quick succession. During this period, the person feels that the 
"self," or some reference indicating the "thinking entity" becomes united with or "at one" 
with the symbolic form of all space-time. It might be called Allah, God, Cosmic 
Consciousness, or even some idiosyncratic label. Slightly deviant forms include 
references to intellectual abstracts such as "mathematical balance," "consciousness of 
time," or "extraterrestrial intrusions."These phenomena are similar to mystical states and 
the more secular ''peak experiences." 
Usually the God Experience involves euphoric and msitive emotions. The oerson 
reports a t);pe of God high that is characterized by a sense of profound meaningfilness, 
mcefulness. and cosmic serenitv. Invariably the state is oerfused with references to 
Auction of death anxiety. It is dkned  as thd anticipated eiinction of the selfconceit 
or "the thinking entity." During the God Experience, the person suddenly feels that he or 
she will not die. Instead, he or she will live forever as a part of subset ofthe symbol of all 
spacetime. If the symbol is a father image, then the person expects to become a child of 
the father. If the symbol is "imageless," the person expects to become a part of the 
Universal Whole. 
Sometimes God Experiences can have negative emotional valences. During these 
periods, the same sense of oneness is pervaded by anxiety and fear. It is the epitome of 
terror. These experiences rarely happen more than once, except in psychiatric patients; 
the consequences punish any further display. Labels a~plied to these exoeriences reflect 
the bad, aiersive o;generally-evil componenis in the cuiture in which thebrson survives. 
Classic references involve "hell," "demon world," or the more abstract "nether world." 
" Michael A. Persinger, Neuropsychological Bases of God Belids (New York and 
London: Praeger, 1987). 
l9 See Persinger, "Religious and Mystical Experiences as Artifacts of Temporal Lobe 
Function: a General Hypothesis,"PercephralandMotorSkills 57 (1983): 1255-62; "Striking 
EEG Profiles from Single Episodes of Glossolaliaand Transcendental Meditation,"Percephral 
andMotor Skills 58 (1994): 127-33; "Pwple Who Report Religious Experiences May Also 
Display E n h a n d  Temporal-Lobe Signs,"PercephralandMotor Skills 58 (1994): 963-75; 
"Propensity to Report Paranormal Experiences Is Correlated with Temporal Lobe Signs," 
Perceptual and  Motor Skills 59 (1994): 583-86; and "Death Anxiety as a Semantic 
Conditioned Suppression Paradigm," Perceptual and Motor Skills 60 (1995): 827-30. 
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They are not traditionally called God Experiences, although they are certainly derived 
from the same source of variance. The self, with respect to space-time and imminent 
dissolution (death), still dominates the experience?' 
Persinger goes on to &suss God concepts and how God experiences and God 
concepts combine in God beliefs. f i s  description of God experiences apparently 
derives from many interviews and clinical encounters with people who claim to have 
had them." He stnkes the main themes that recur in phenomenological descriptions 
of discrete ultimacy experiences: they involve m d ~ c a t i o n s  of sensory awareness, 
sense of self, sense of presences, cognitions, and emotions. 
2.2 Discrete Uljtimacy Experiences: Oito 
In The Idea ofthe Holy, Rudolf Otto attempted to describe the irrational or supra- 
rational elements of religious experience.22 He focused on what we are calling 
discrete rather than extended ultimacy experiences, calling them numinous 
experiences. He argued for the autonomy and uniqueness of numinous experience 
and he tned to show that it is involved in everythmg from faint religious stirrings to 
the most profound mystical experience. Otto characterized their two main features 
in the phrase "mysfenum mmendum." He described mmendum in terms of three 
elements: awefhess, overpoweringness, and energy or urgency. He described 
mysterium in terms of the wholly other and fascination. 
Otto also discussed the means of expression of the numinous, including how it 
is awakened in one mind upon seeing its experience described or enacted by 
He pointed out that it cannot be taught or described in such a way to 
"pass" it on but rather that there must be some independent experience that answers 
to the descriptions of it that are passed around the group. Thus it can be expressed 
directly only through an individual's encounter with holy places, holy events, and 
holy people. It can be expressed indirectly by making use of the ways we express 
feelings similar to those with numinous elements. Thus he spoke of art and language 
that convey terror and dread, responses that are capable of evoking numinous 
feelings of the mmendum kind. Under thls heading he also mentioned its higher 
expressions: grandeur and sublimity. Under the heading of the mysterium Otto 
mentioned expression in the form of miracle; that which cannot be comprehended 
serves as analogy for the mysterium and is capable of evoking it. Under this heading 
he also treated the only half-intelligible language of devotion, including liturgy, 
ritual, and some music, as well as many other types of analogies. 
One of the great strengths of Otto's work is hls focused exploration of the 
emotional content of numinous experiences. This focus is also a weakness with 
respect to the desire for completeness of phenomenological descriptions. But even 
Persinger, Neuropsychological Bases of God Beliefs, 1-2. 
bid., xi. 
'' Rudolf Otto, The Idea ofihe Holy: An Inquily into he  Non-rafionalFacfor in the Idea 
of the Divine and ih Relation to h e  Rational, 3rd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 
1925; tr. from the ninth German ed. by John W. Harvey; first published 1917). 
See section 4, below, for a discussion of the function of mirror neurons. This can be 
thought of as one neurological consideration bearing on Otto's ideas about the awakening of 
numinous experiences acted on or described by one person in other people. This remains 
highly speculative, however, because mirror neurons have been studied primarily in relation 
to motor functions. 
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h s  brief summary of Otto's discussion permits an inference that the rest of the book 
justdies: discrete ultimacy experiences involve modifications of sensory awareness, 
sense of self, sense of presences, cognitions, and emotions. The characteristic 
elements of dlscrete ultimacy experiences appear in both Otto's and Persinger's very 
different analyses. 
Another strength of Otto's work is his argument for the uniqueness and 
autonomy of the numinous. That is, he believes that the numinous element of discrete 
ultimacy experiences is objective enough to force particular descriptions and specific 
forms of concept stretching and cognitive breakdown to appear repeatedly and 
predictably across the various manifestations of religion. For example, key 
metaphors recur such as: encounter with a person, reason-transcending mystery, the 
power for salvation or liberation, peaceful presence, abysmal anxiety, and so on. We 
find this claim intriguing and return to it below in section 3. However, we think that 
far too little has been done by way of comparative phenomenology even now to draw 
Otto's conclusions with his confidence, and he drew them when almost no work had 
been done.24 
2.3 Discrete Lntimacy Experiences: Elements 
We might well draw other phenomenological descriptions into the mix.2' We think 
the same five elements recur in those accounts. In summarizing the phenomenology 
of discrete ultimacy experiences we will make brief remarks about each of the five 
elements, indicating some of the variations within each element. 
Sensory Alterations. Under h s  heading we would include perceptions that are 
incongruous with the current environmental situation. There may be the perception 
that the surroundings are suffused with light or otherwise perceptually dflerent. 
There may be audltory or olfactory sensations as well as visions or hallucinations. 
Related to this category but distinguishable are percepts bearing on the sense of self 
or on the sense of a presence near oneself, or perhaps a nonlocalized presence (see 
below). 
" There are a number of scholarly traditions in the study of religion that have explored the 
claim that the sacred or numinous causes the same symbols, myths, and ideas to recur in the 
world's religions, including most famously the comparative studies of mythology influenced 
by Carl Jung's theory of archetypes. See, for example, Joseph Campbell, The Mash of God 
(New York: VIking Press, 1959-68), 4 vols.: Primitive Mythology, Oriental Mythology, 
Occidental Mythology, and Creative Mythology, and many of the works of Mircca Eliade, 
including Cosmos and History: The Myth of the Eternal Return (New York: Harper, 1959; 
first English ed., 1954), Myths, Dreams, and Mysteries (New York: Harper, 1960), and 
Images andS'bols (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1961). Also influenced by Jung, and an 
important influence on this trend in religious studies, is structuralism; see especially Claude 
Levi-Strauss, Totemism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963; tr. from the French by Rodney 
Needham). On Jung himself, see Joseph Campbell, ed., The Portable Jung (New York: 
Penguin Books, 1976). The perennial philosophy makes the same claim on a different basis, 
though not independent of the Jungian emphasis on archetypes. See, for example, Huston 
Smith, Forgotten Truth: The Common Vision of the World's Religions, reprint ed. (San 
Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1992; first ed., 1965); and Aldous Huxley, The Perennial 
Philosophy (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1945). 
" See the phenomenological descriptions in, for example, James, Varieties, and Eugene G. 
d'Aquili and Andrew B. Newberg, "Religious and Mystical States: A Neuropsychological 
Model," Zygon: Journal of Religion andscience 28 (June, 1993): 177-99. 
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SelfAlterations. A person may feel as if outside his or her own body. There may 
be a loss of the sense of the individual self as real or as the source of thought or will, 
and a sense of merger with the universe. There may be a feeling of union of the self 
with an entity such as God or the Infinite. There may be a sense of the enlarging of 
the self accompanied by powerfUl feelings of compassion and confidence. There may 
be a sense of the self as profoundly threatened by judgment or anruhllation in the 
presence of a being of enormous power. There may be a sense of altered bodily 
functions or of the self being taken over by another being (see below). 
Pmsences. In certain discrete states, a person may experience the sense of a 
presence felt as mysterious or awesome; this may have both positive and negative 
modulations. A person may feel the presence of nonphysical beings, either benign 
or evil, such as angels or demons. There may be a sen& of being invaded, inhabited, 
or controlled by such beings. 
Cognition. There may be a sudden sense of illumination or profound understand- 
ing. There may be a sense of increased awareness, or a sense of the unreality of the 
world. There may be a conviction of sin or weakness, or a sense of assurance of 
salvation or emotional and spiritual healing. There is a very important cognitive 
feature that invariably accompanies all the other phenomena of discrete states:"~hey 
are as convincing to those who have them as any direct sensible experiences can be, 
and they are, as a rule, much more convincing than results established by mere logic 
ever are."26 
Emotions. Under this heading we would include intense feelings that are either 
incongruous with the current context or expressive of a social that is itself 
incongruous with usual patterns, such as feelings of ecstasy, awe, dread, guilt, safety, 
or tranquility. There may be the experience of utter darkness or despair in the quest 
for mystical union, the mystics' dark night of the soul. 
2.4 Edended Ultimacy Experiences: Berger 
There are two classes of extended ultirnacy experiences. The first concerns dynamic, 
socially embedded processes of orientation and control in relation to the cosmos, the 
social world, and one's self. For convenience, we shall call these processes social 
ultimacy experiences. The Durkheimian tradition of the social analysis of religion 
focuses on such processes but tends to downplay the individual religious experiences 
associated with them. Peter Berger's The Sacmd Canopy is more balan~ed.~' In
particular, Berger blends the Durkheimian tradition with the sociology ofknowledge 
and extends both of them in a direction that is at once more sensitive to individual 
experiences and more useful for theologically directed inquiries that seek to press 
questions of truth and causation in relation to ultimacy. 
Berger assumes both that "every human society is an enterprise of world- 
building"28 and that "all socially constructed worlds are precario~s."~~ From these 
premises he analyzes the role of religion in society. World-construction is a '  
dialectical process between individuals and their social context. Human beings first 
externalize their being in the world, whereupon the outpouring of themselves is 
l6 James, Varieties, 72. 
" Peter L. Berger, The Sacred Canopy: Elements o fa  Sociological Theov ofleligion 
(Garden City: Doubleday, 1967). 
Ibid., 3; see chap. 1, "Religion and World-Construction." 
Ibid., 29; see ch. 2, "Religion and World-Maintenance." 
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They also threaten the social order whenever they lie beyond the reach of the control 
acheved by ordmary socialization. Occurring outside of a context in which they are 
expected and explained, such experiences may upset the stability of the relationship 
between individual and society. Their occurrence in religious contexts, however, 
provides an effective means of controlling an individual's engagement with the 
social order. More than that, ultimacy experiences occurring in such contexts may 
even enhance social regulation by reinforcing processes of legitimation already 
active in religious groups: to experience personally is to confirm a group's legiti- 
mating claims. In these ways, therefore, ultimacy experiences orient individuals and, 
when occurring in an appropriately authoritative context, serve social interests of 
control. 
While these effects are relevant to both discrete and extended ultimacy 
experiences, it is only in the context of an extended process of socially-guided 
interpretation of ultimacy experiences, which in many cases can themselves be 
regarded as extended ultimacy experiences, that the effects oforientation and control 
appear. For thls reason, we class@ the orientation and control dimensions of 
religious experiences as extended ultimacy experiences of the social type. 
2.5 Exfended Urtimacy Experiences: Kierkegaard 
The second class of extended ultimacy experiences concerns gradual and chronic 
experiences of personal change or self-transcendence, such as Confucian self- 
cultivation, Christian sanctification, and possibly also character changes having little 
explicit connection with religious symbols and practices. Some conversions are of 
this extended type. For convenience, we shall call these transformative ultimacy 
experiences. While a vast literature on conversion clamors for attention here, we turn 
to Snrren herkegaard's extraordinary phenomenology of the process of transforma- 
tion associated with extended ultimacy  experience^.^' Intending h s  analysis as an 
answer to the great question, "What ought I do?" his answer famously subordinated 
moral sensibilities to religious ones in the third and final stage of an ongoing process 
of transformation dnven by awareness of an intimate relationship with God. The 
rationally and ethically transcendent character of religious transformation has been 
noticed repeatedly and Kierkegaard's classic expression of it is worthy of summary. 
The fist  stage of the religious-moral quest is the aesthetic. This is the search for 
sensual and intellectual pleasure. Kierkegaard argued that such a search eventually 
leads to boredom and then suicide and thus that there is an impulse to move to a form 
of life in which there is a conception of oughtness. The second stage is thus the moral 
or ethical stage in which we freely align ourselves with the moral law and make a 
determination to be good. Kierkegaard's arch-enemy was G.W.F. Hegel, who tried 
to synthesize the moral life and the aesthetic life; Kierkegaard admired Hegel's effort 
but judged it to be merely the highest form of aestheticism. Kierkegaard argued that 
" Kierkegaard is usually neglected as an asset for descriptive tasks such as ours because he 
is so expliciiy passionate &I author. His analysis coven much more than conversion, however, 
and it captures dimensions of the process of reli~ious transformation that most treatments of 
wnversibn miss. Moreover, it is &e archetypal iistance of objectivity of description achieved 
through passionate inwardness. See Ssren Kierkegaard, Feor ond Trembling; Repetition, ed. 
and tr. with introduction and notes by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong from the 1 st 1843 
Danish ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983); Eitherlor, 4. and tr. with 
introduction and notes by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong from the 1 st 1843 Danish ed. 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987). 
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a jump is involved in moving from the aesthetic to the ethical and that we must 
simply choose. The third stage is the religious, in which we find ourselves dnven to 
suspend ethical concerns in the name of fidelity to an awesome encounter with God 
Nerkegaard called thls a "teleological suspension of the ehcal"). In the religious 
life, divine command is paramount and true love for God is expressed in the 
willingness to set aside moral habits and to respond to the divine command with 
purity of heart. If purity of heart is to will one thmg, then for Kierkegaard its hlghest 
form is to will not the moral law but God. 
Whereas Hegel and also Immanuel Kant took everything, even God, to be 
consistent with the moral law, Kierkegaard argued that the divine command is 
rationally unapproachable. The contrast between the moral and religious stages is 
movingly expressed in the discussion of Abraham and I s a a ~ . ~  Abraham becomes for 
Kierkegaard the one whose life of faith (the religious stage) transcends moral 
categories through obedience to God--even rationally and ehcally impeachable 
divine w h s ;  morality derives from God, it does not rule God. According to 
Kierkegaard God has set us in a situation in which these choices (particularly in the 
movement from the second to the third stage) cannot be made rationally but are 
criterionless; this is essential to the life of faith. This is the brutal situation of human 
life and draws our attention to the fundamental character of decision: one's very soul 
depends upon it. 
Kierkegaard's analysis of what we are calling transformative extended ultimacy 
experiences highlights the importance of choice and focuses on the existentially 
potent transformation of personality and character under the influence of profound, 
ongoing experiences of loyalty to and love for God. It also highlights the way that the 
transformation of people under the impact of extended ultimacy expenences induces 
new beliefs about themselves, about ultimacy (be it represented as God or somethmg 
else), and about their own behavior and choices. Kierkegaard says comparatively 
little about the social embedding so characteristic of extended ultimacy experiences, 
which most other accounts, especially in the literature of conversion, stress. 
2.6 Extended Ultimacy Experiences: Elements 
Extended ultimacy experiences are typically less perceptually dramatic than discrete 
ultimacy experiences. They may occur in conjunction with episodes of the discrete 
states described above. however, and they may be strong enough that individuals feel 
as if they are more or less continually in communication with a deity and receiving 
assurance or direction in daily matters. Whether explicitly religious or not, we notice 
several recurring characteristics of extended ultimacy experiences: existential 
potency, social embedding, transformations of behavior and personality, and 
transformations of beliefs. All four elements seem important to various degrees in 
both the social and the transformation types of extended ultimacy experiences. 
Existential Potency. Whereas discrete ultimacy experiences can occur in ways 
that may sometimes leave people wondering what happened and how it might be 
relevant to their lives, one of the hallmarks of extended ultimacy experiences is the 
direct existential relevance they are felt to have. The orienting and transforming 
dimensions of extended ultimacy experiences make this particularly clear. 
"See Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, "Eulogy and Abraham," 15-23, and the 
subsequent discussion. 
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Social Embedding. Extended ultimacy experiences make little sense in isolation 
from a community within which they can be interpreted and by whose interpretation 
they are made existentially potent. The social embedding is effective in two 
directions, as we have seen. On the one hand, a person participates in the benefits 
of the community's interpretive and narrative power. Their experiences of ultimacy 
are channeled into and through that narrative framework and then focused into 
transformative potency or the need for orientation to cosmos, world, society, and self. 
Without h s  community, the person must self-generate the authority needed to make 
the assumptions expressed in such orienting and transforming processes plausible 
and effective, and very few people seem capable of doing that alone, if it even makes 
sense to do so. 
On the other hand, a community mediates the wider society's need for stability 
(includmg control of marginal situations created by the occurrence of ultimacy 
experiences) by means of its participation in social legitimation processes. This 
control is exercised in a variety of ways. Sometimes social values are redfirmed in 
the cosmically loaded narrative offered by the religious group; this is ubiquitous. 
When ultimacy experiences make that narrative existentially more vivid for 
individuals, the legitimation of linked social values is correspondmgly strong. Other 
times, the effects of potentially socially disruptive sentiments and even critiques 
inspired by ultimacy experiences are controlled by being given limited expression 
within the religious group, releasing tension that otherwise might be socially 
explosive. This is the case, for example, with shamanic rituals, which are often 
performed in public: they help people let off steam, as it were, without threatening 
the social structure or calling its values too much into question. 
Transformation of Behavior and Personali~. The classic religious expression 
of behavior and personality transformation is permanent conversion. Conversion 
occurs when an individual orders h s  or her life in accordance with the felt reality of 
ultimacy experiences. Rarely is a conversion experience accomplished under the 
lduence solely of a discrete ultimacy experience, but rather extended ultimacy 
experiences that result in conversion often occur in conjunction with the more 
discrete experiences. 
It is important to note that, in the absence of discrete ultimacy experiences and 
a religious social-linguistic context, a nominally nonreligious conversion may take 
place in the form of character transformation, a combination of behavior and 
personality transformation. Character transformation is a staple of literature, a well- 
known example being the novel Emma in which the thoughtless young protagonist, 
at first chided by Knightley, gradually comes to assume moral responsibility 
herself.)' Such accounts are usually punctuated by a crisis of remorse in whch the 
protagonist perceives the whole of his or her existence up to that point as morally 
deficient and shamehl. 
What are the distinctive features of the new interpretive framework whose 
internalization marks character transformation? We can think of other instances in 
which someone is brought into a new interpreuve framework-for example, when 
he or she is introduced to a school of philosophy; or when he or she joins the military 
and adopts its vocabulary, actions, and modes of thought; or when he or she is 
psychoanalyzed and adopts certain new concepts for understanding his or her own 
experiences and actions. In the kmds of transformations we are considering at the 
moment, by contrast, the interpretive framework has primarily to do with a moral 
"Jane Austen, Emma (New York: Knopf, 1991; first published 1833). 
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order-&erkegaardYs movement from the first to the second stage. Now, the self and 
what is called the moral-social order are fundamentally related, as reflected by the 
designation of the self as "a location within the moral-social order."" Since the 
transformation in question has to do with participating in a new kind of moral order, 
the self must inevitably be changed. 
A feature of the new kmd of moral order in which a person participates, in the 
process we are calling character transformation, is that it seems to supersede the 
prior moral order in a recognizable way. For example, in Emma the moral order in 
which the heroine operated at first was one of trivial gossip, shallow amusement, 
attention to appearance rather than substance, and a hsregard for the feelings of 
others. The question of ultimacy is raised because the movement to a new moral 
system in all such stories is not just a move to something different: it is a move to 
somethmg we recognize as better or higher. This implies that there is somethmg 
unique about the conceptual-linguistic system offered by the moral advisor, 
something that may be universally recognizablejust as accounts of discrete 
ultimacy experiences in various cultures are often cross-culturally recognizable. 
Such accounts are widespread in literature, which we take to mean that the topic of 
moral development is compelling to human beings regardless of their religious 
background. Furthermore, we note that such accounts can induce transformative 
effects in their readers: that is, a narrative depicting a character's introduction to a 
new moral system can itself promote moral transformation. 
The kind of transformation of behavior and personality that we have been 
hscussing thus far seems to encompass both nominally religious and nominally non- 
religious contexts. But the transformation expressed by Gerkegaard in the leap from 
the ethical to the religious is specifically religious. It rarely shows up in secular 
literature; the relativity of moral conventions is sometimes thematized, especially in 
existentialist literature, but the inevitability of anxiety and despair tend to be the 
lessons drawn rather than the possibility of a supra-rational, morality-transcendmg, 
transformative religious experience. The closest literary analogue for thls kmd of 
transformation may be outlaw heroes-not Robin Hood, who is essentially a moral 
prophet, but early Wild West outlaws such as Billy the Kid or Jesse James. They 
engage in a teleological suspension of the ethical, with the moral law being defied 
in service of their own gain. If allegiance to the moral law were suspended for the 
love of God instead of for personal profit, there would be strong &ty between 
such figures and Kierkegaard's truly religious person. In religious literature, by 
contrast, especially in the lives of the saints or in great mystical writings of many 
religious traditions, the possibility of the truly religious person in Kierkegaard's 
sense shows up lucidly again and again. Friedrich Nietzsche may have had 
somethmg llke this in mind when he spoke of the Ubennensch: the person whose 
morality is autonomously generated out of a rich mystical sensibility rather than 
being merely a personal appropriation of extant social  convention^.^' Kierkegaard 
'O Rom Hard, PersonalBeing: A Theoryjbrlndividual Psychology (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1984). 
" See Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathusb.a, in The Portable Nietzsche, ed. and 
trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Penguin Books, 1954); and idem, The MI1 to Power, 
ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: VIntageBooks, 1968). The 
interpretation ofNietzsche's Ubennensch is complex; for a penetrating aocount of its mystical 
and warrior sensibilities, see Stephen Main, "Abyss Without a Ground: Nietzschean 
Spirituality and Self-Healing" (Chicago: University of Chicago, dissertation, 1999). 
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and especially Nietzsche tend to be overly optimistic about what individuals can 
accomplish independently of sustaining communities. More oAen, the &andmation 
they describe depends upon a background community even when the transformation 
itself passes beyond the bounds of the usual for that community, as is typical. 
Transformation of Beliefs. The nature of the beliefs that accompany behavior 
and personality changes distinguishes religious and nonreligious lransfmtion. The 
content of a person's beliefs is heavily conditioned by the social-linguistic 
framework available to him or her from others; thus, religious beliefs are highly 
variable due to the many cultural contexts in which they arise. In any individual case, 
they also may depend on the phenomenological aspects of discrete ultimacy 
experiences, especially when they involve presences and unusual cognitions. In 
general, the beliefs that accompany religious transformation (conversion) may 
concern the individual's relation to a higher being or abstract principle-the placing 
of his or her finite existence into a meaningful context, the worth or value of other 
living beings, and the general meaning or purpose of the whole of the universe. 
These beliefs are usually intertwined. 
3 Neurological Considerations 
As mentioned above, those interested in the neural basis of religious experience are 
at the mercy of the stage of neuroscience's development during the period in which 
they are working.42 As very little was known about the brain in James's time, he was 
not able to offer detailed neural hypotheses, which has undoubtedly contributed to 
the timelessness of his writing. Contemporary speculations on the neural basis of 
religious or mystical experiences tend to be freighted with neuroscientdic part- 
concepts doomed to be left by the wayside (as opposed to tested and rejected) as 
neuroscience evolves. Nevertheless, while we await the anival of a general scientdic 
theory of brain function-and only such a theory can render speculations regarding 
psychological phenomena sensible-we may adumbrate certain links between the 
phenomena of ultimacy experiences and clinical neurological data. 
These links support a neurological model of ultimacy experiences that we shall 
rely on in the causal model of section 7, but it is at best a tentative part-model. We 
try to stay in close contact with physiological knowledge experimentally derived 
from large numbers of clinical cases in order to reduce reliance on speculation, with 
the consequence that we can adumbrate our model in some areas while we are forced 
to give scant attention to other important areas. Other theorists have prized 
completeness in neurological model making more highly than we have; they have 
been willing to pay, and indeed have paid, the higher price demanded in the unstable 
currency of neurological speculation. Both approaches can be helpful, notwithstand- 
ing the predictable fate of any detailed neurological speculation at the current time. 
Relatively complete models such as that of Eugene d'Aquili and Andrew Newberg 
and that of James Austin43 have the great virtue of indicating what might be possible 
even if their detailed descriptions of putative brain states that underpin mystical 
This view is also expressed forcefully in H. Rodney Holmes, "Thinking about Religion 
and Experiencing the Brain: Eugene d'Aquili's Biogenetic Structural Theory of Absolute 
Unitary Being," Zygon 28.2 (1993): 201-30. 
43 See dlAquili and Newberg, "Religious and Mystical States: A Neuropsychological 
Model"; James H. Austin, Zen and the Brain: Toward an Understanding ofMeditation and 
Consciousness (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998). 
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experience place them far from anythmg that has been established empirically in 
mainstream neuro~cience.~~ The tests of intelligibility fUrnished by relatively 
complete speculative models play an important role in subsequent theorizing. 
A preliminary point about the relation between disordered brain function and 
discrete ultimacy experiences needs to be made. Although we have emphasized the 
similarities between certain types of disordered brain function and some of the 
phenomena of discrete ultimacy experiences, we do not imply that ultimacy 
experiences are a form of illness. Unusual mentation, presumably based on unusual 
brain function, does not imply that the resulting experiences are "wrong": consider 
mathematical geniuses or individuals with perfect pitch. Conversely, the fact that an 
indvidual has temporal lobe epilepsy does not rule out the possibility that she or he 
is also having ultimacy experiences. That determination would depend on additional 
criteria (see section 6 below). 
3.1 Elements of a Tentative Neurological Pnrt-Model 
We begin here by introducing the various elements of our neurological model, which 
we cluster into three phases: activation, quality, and social-linguistic condtioning. 
Neural Expmssion: Activation. In broad terms, we expect dscrete ultimacy 
experiences to be correlated in family resemblance fashion with neuronal events 
occurring in medial temporal lobe regions, as has long been tho~ght,~' perhaps 
spreading to the hypothalamus, as speculated by d'Aquili and N e ~ b e r g . ~ ~  It is 
unlikely that the exact pattern of neural activity in discrete experiences of ultimacy 
is invariant from one individual to the next. Instead, there may be brain regions that 
are more or less typically involved in such experiences. If a description of total, real- 
time brain activity becomes available in the future, we would expect that the neural 
patterns corresponding to subjective experiences of ultimacy would be variable, 
bearing family resemblances to one another, with some structures-perhaps anterior 
temporal cortices or the amygdala-more frequently represented in such patterns 
than others. In any event, most discrete ultimacy experiences probably require 
transient activation of the amygdala and hippocampus. Such activation probably 
occurs spontaneously in normal individuals due to random fluctuations in neuronal 
activity. This is not to say that individuals could not train themselves to induce such 
activity: in animal models chronic stimulation produces permanent alterations of 
Rodney Holmes insists in his review of d'Aquili's workthat there is not yet any scientific 
way to confirm much of what the model hypothesizes; see his "Thinking about Religion and 
Experiencing the Brain." Yet d'Aquili is quite correct that mainstream neuroscience has 
wanted little to do with brain imaging of religious experience both because it is hard to arrange 
mystical states on cue and perhaps because of a vague prejudice against religion. This has left 
the territory to research groups with an ideological agenda, whose results are typically ignored 
by mainstream neuroscience; dlAquili and Newberg exclude them, as do we. Were this not 
the case, effective scientific evaluation of the speculative proposals of d'Aquili and Newberg 
and other theorists might be more feasible. See dlAquili's reply to his critics in "Apologiapro 
Scriptura Sua, or Maybe We Got It Right After All," Zygon 28.2 (June 1993): 25 1-66. 
4' Persinger aptly calls them "temporal lobe transients", see Neuropsychological Bases of 
GodBeliejs. Also see Wilder Penfield and Phanor Perot, "TheBrain'sRecord of Auditory and 
Visual Experience: a Final Summary and Discussion,"Brain 86 (1963): 595-702; Jaynes's 
discussion of Wernicke's area, as well as Penfield's and Perot's results in The Origin of 
Consciousness, 107-12; and almost every other neurological study of religious experience. 
46 D7Aquili and Newberg, "Religious and Mystical States." 
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connectivity in medial temporal structures more readily than in any other brain areas. 
Whether induced intentionally or not, there may be precursor experience-rtain 
h d s  of concentration or preoccupation-that hspose toward these events. 
The neural expressions of social and transformative extended ultirnacy 
experiences are poorly understood and doubtless extremely diverse. In relation to the 
dunension of control, dlAquili and Newberg hypothesize a set of neural schemas that 
underlie the detection of and the striving imaginatively to complete causal sequences 
of events. They M h e r  speculate that these schemas underlie much of the human 
need of religion for the crucial task of controlling the envir~nment.~' 
Neural fipmssion: Qualiv. With regard to discrete ultimacy experiences, there 
are neurological data relevant to each of the phenomenological elements discussed 
earlier. With regard to sensory alterations and emotions, experiential phenomena 
occurring in discrete epileptic episodes, correlated with abnormal electrical 
discharges, have some similarities to phenomena described during discrete mystical 
or religious experiences in non-epileptic individuals; see section 3.2 on temporal 
lobe epilepsy, below." With regard to cognition, data are scarce. However, the sense 
of conviction that attends ultimacy experiences may be explicable in neural terms; 
the relevant data are discussed in section 3.3. With regard to self-alterations and 
sense of presences, neurological data on alterations of person experience are most 
thought provoking; see section 3.4 below. 
In relation to the phenomenal qualities of extended ultimacy experiences, we 
have little to say specifically about the neural underpinnings of the quality of 
existential potency. Of course, insofar as this involves cognitive certainty, the 
process of global semantic matching (mentioned in section 3.3) is relevant. Data on 
chronic personality changes due to temporal lobe pathology exist, however, and 
these are important for understanhg transformation of behavior, personality, and 
beliefs; see section 3.5 below. The entire model is also relevant here: it shows how 
cognitive-somatic-emotional experiences might lead to a revision in stored, 
47 DYAquili and Newberg call these schemas cognitive operators: 
The copitive operators we are refemn to handle abstraction of generals h pdculars, the 
percept~on of abstract causaliv in extem~mli ty ,  the perception of spatial or temporal sequences in 
extemal reality, and the odmng  of elements of reali into causal chains giving rise to explanatory 
models ofthe extemal world, whether scientific or m&cal. Briefly, the inferior parietal lobule on the 
dominant h e n q h r e  ofthe brain, the anterior convexity ofthe frontal lobes primarily on the dominant 
side, and their reciprocal neural interconnections have been fairly definitively shown to munt  for 
causal sequencin of elements of reality abstracted fiom sense per ons. The v a t i o n  of cross- 
modal transfer, wkch is specific to the hnnion ofthe inferior paneta%ule, is p&cularly implicated 
in causal sequencing. For convenience we refer to the anterior convexity ofthe hmtal lobe, the inferior 
parietal lobule,, and their reciprocal intermections as the causal operator. Thus the causal 
operator.. . [a] strip of reality into what is subjectively w i v e d  as causal sequences back 
to the i n i t i a l c u s  of that strip. In view of the apparently uruversal human trait, under ordinary 
circumstances, of positing causes for any given strip of reality, we postulate that ifthe initial tenninus 
is not given by sense data, the causal operator automatically generates an initial tenninus." 
Therein lies the connection to religion, as well as a bold attempt to specify the neural basis for 
what Immanuel Kant called the transcendental illusion. See d'Aquili and Newberg, "The 
Neuropsychological Basis of Religions, or Why God Won't Go Away," Zygon 33.2 (1998): 
190-91. 
48 Of course, there are important differences between the phenomena of epilepsy and 
experiences of ultimacy. One is that ultimacy experiences are much more likely to be positive 
in tone, whereas the emotions experienced in complex partial seizures are more usually 
negative, though dread is fairly common in both cases. Another difference is the 
stereotypically repeated character of complex partial seizure experiences. This, however, does 
not prevent us from learning from similarities, where they exist. 
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generalized representations of self and world. The social embeddmg of extended 
ultimacy experiences has neurological connections as well; see section 3.6, which 
concerns brain functions that allow individuals to participate in the elaboration of 
social-linguistic systems. 
Social-Linguistic Conditioning. Through their interconnections, the brain's 
neurons form a dense network that functions as a social-linguistic milieu for the 
interpretation and integration of novel experiences. The social-linguistic condition- 
ing of ultirnacy experiences b e p s  with the process of global matclung (already 
mentioned) and continues in enormously complex ways to allow individuals to 
participate in the performances and narratives of the larger social world, and to 
incorporate these into neural semantic structures. Neurological data relevant to 
social-linguistic conditioning are discussed most directly in section 3.3 below. 
The remainder of section 3 discusses the five important classes of relevant 
neurological data alluded to in this introduction. Most of the data we treat derive 
from careful study of many clinical cases. One part of our account-global 
matching-is more speculative. It derives from a well-articulated theory of how the 
hippocampus and neocortex interact during normal learning; the theory is based in 
part on experimental evidence and in part on neural net simulations of semantic 
learning. The data we discuss involve no necessary religious content but rather bear 
on general processes for making sense of any current episode or information. 
3.2 Temporal Lobe Epilepsy and Discrete Alterations of Experience 
Deep within the anterior end of the temporal lobe in each hemisphere, below the 
cortical surface, lie two phylogenetically ancient structures: the amygdala and the 
hippocampus. Under normal conditions, the amygdala links incoming, highly 
processed sensory information to somatic outputs through its connections to the 
hypothalamus, to brainstem centers also involved in visceral control, and to primitive 
motor centers in the basal ganglia. When the amygdala is artificially stimulated by 
external electrical sources in human patients, somatic events that accompany 
emotions-sensations of tightness in the chest or piloerection ("goose bumps"), for 
example-are often produced. Visible signs such as pallor or fearful expressions 
may be seen. Various emotions, usually unpleasant, are often reported. The 
hippocampus is known to play a sigmficant role in memory processes: disruption of 
its normal activity may cause failure to encode events. Because the hippocampus and 
amygdala lie adjacent to one another and are interconnected, they are often 
considered as a functional unit in investigations of the clinical effects of stimulation. 
It is also possible that the cortices immediately surrounding them, on the ventral and 
medial surfaces ofthe temporal lobe,are activated by electrical discharges occurring 
in these deeper structures. Cognitive experiences such as ddja-vu (the feeling that 
what is currently before one has been seen before) fiequently result fiom stimulation 
of the medial temporal lobes, as do unpleasant emotions and brief mnemonic 
episodes.49 
In animal models, the amygdala and hippocampus have very low thresholds for 
the induction of spontaneous seizures in response to chronic, low-level electrical 
stimulation. In clinical populations, these structures are often the source of complex 
'' See Eric Halgren, R. Walter, D. Cherlow, and P. Crandall, "Mental Phenomena Evoked 
by Electrical Stimulation of the Human Hippocampal Formation and Arnygdala," Brain 101 
(1978): 83-1 17. 
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partial seizures (CPS)-seizures characterized by cognitive, affective, or psycho- 
sensory symptoms, with or without motor automatisms. Unusual experiential 
phenomena are correlated with repetitive electrical discharges in the temporal lobes. 
The following descriptions are summarized fiom a review by G.W. Fent~n .~ '  
Sensory phenomena in CPS can occur in any modality or in several together. Formed 
visual hallucinations may be simple and static, or intricate and progressing in time. 
An example of the latter is the image of a man carrying a cane accompanied by a 
dog. Another patient reported seeing irregular colored triangles replaced by the 
hallucination of a robber coming after h m  with a gun. Usually such experiences, and 
the ones described below, are repeated almost identically each time the patient has 
a seizure. Vertigmous hallucinations vary fiom simple sensations such as rotation to 
more complex sensations such as floating. Illusions can also involve any sensory 
modality. Objects may appear larger or smaller than they are. Shapes or sounds may 
become distorted. A limb may feel as if it does not belong to the patient or it may 
seem detached. 
Any emotion may occur as a seizure phenomenon. The quality ranges fiom a 
crude undifferentiated welling up of feeling intruding on the patient's consciousness 
and unrelated to anythmg in the immediate environment, to highly refined feelings 
related to ongoing events in the environment. Fear is the most frequent. Pleasurable 
experiences are rare (sudden feelings of ecstasy, elation, happiness, serenity, or 
relaxation) but do occur. Unpleasant emotions that cannot be identified by the patient 
are not uncommon. The physiological basis of pleasurable versus unpleasurable 
experiences in CPS is unknown. 
Under the category of cognitive symptomatology occuning in CPS, Fenton 
describes three subgroups. The first is ideational. The most common of this type of 
symptom, according to Fenton, is forced thinking-that is, the subject is incapable 
of resisting or putting out ofhis head some repetitive thought. The thought itself can 
be subjective, as in an idea such as death or immortality; it can be objective, as in a 
fixation upon a phrase read or heard before the attack; or it can be unidentifiable and 
impossible to recall after the attack. The second category is dysmnesic. Illusions of 
memory are common in CPS. These include dCja-vu, deja-entendu, and deja-vecu 
(these are encompassed by our usual use of the term deja-vu), whch are illusions of 
familiarity, and jamais-vu, jamais-entendu, and jamais-vCcu, which are illusions of 
unfamiliarity. Other cognitive experiences in CPS include disturbances of time 
perception and the feeling that the world is not real (derealization). An additional 
cognitive phenomenon worthy of note in CPS is depersonalization; that is, the feeling 
that one's self is not real or that one is seeing one's body from an outside location. 
We discuss this below, in section 3.4. 
There are theories regardmg the anatomical basis of somatic, affective, 
mnemonic, and cognitive experiences arising fiom temporal lobe dysfunction. 
Somatic and affective phenomena are ascribed to the activation of amygdala 
efferents, such as those to the brainstem and hypothalamus mentioned above. 
Mnemonic phenomena (memories) are thought to be evoked when either the 
amygdala or hppocampus activates more widespread cortical areas in which 
networks of neurons encode records of sensory experience. The cognitive 
experiences are less well understood, however. According to some theories, the 
See G.W. Fenton, "Psychiatric Disorders of Epilepsy: Classification and 
Phenomenology," in Epilepsy andPsychiaby, E. Reynolds and M. Trimble, eds. (New York: 
Churchill Livingstone, 1981), 12-26. 
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hippocampus matches current experience with previously encoded episodes: 
possibly, if a match is falsely created, the experience of dkjh-vu could occur. 
M-Marsel Mesulam speculates that unusual neuronal dscharges in m d a l  temporal 
structures might dsrupt the normal "balance between affect on one hand and 
perception and thought on the other.'"' He considers phenomena such as dkjh-vu and 
feelings of unreality to be a combination of sensory and affective experience. 
The occurrence of derealization in CPS suggests that the conviction of the 
undeniable reality of ongoing e x p e r i e n w u r  usual stance towards the flow of 
even- on temporal lobe mechanisms. Experiences of dkja-vu teach us that 
the sense of familiarity can go awry; similarly, derealization phenomena suggest that 
the sense of conviction of reality can go awry as well. Just as the sense of familiarity 
can be either inappropriately missing (jamais-vu) or inappropriately present (deja- 
vu) due to altered neural activity, the sense of conviction of reality might be affected 
by altered neuronal activity in the temporal lobe. We speculate that the conviction 
of reality, to which we now turn, depends on a process of global semantic matchmg 
that takes place in the temporal lobes. 
3.3 Semantic Recessing of Dbcrete Experiences 
Semantic memory refers to stored information that is impersonal, and includes 
knowledge of words and their meanings, knowledge about objects and their intemlation- 
ships, and also general information about the world (e.g., knowing the meaning of the 
word generous, knowing the capital of France). Episodic and semantic memory are 
considered to be closely related and to interact with each other continuously.. . . Thus 
semantic knowledge is at least partly built up from information first acquired via episodic 
memory. Conversely, episodic memories have to be interpreted within the framework of 
existing semantic knowledge." 
Neuropsychological investigations show that the hippocampus is responsible for 
recording each new experienced event; however, permanent storage takes place 
gradually as a result of changes in the temporal cortex. According to one model, 
"repeated reinstatement of the hippocampal memory results in an accumulation of 
subtle neocortical changes, allowing the new memory (either episodic or semantic) 
to be integrated gradually into existing neocortical networks."" 
The following clinical case, a patient with a progressive deficit in semantic 
memory, hghlights the centrality of semantic processing and indicates its probable 
anatomy.s4 When the patient presented for evaluation, he had a five-year history of 
word-finding problems and recent problems with word comprehension. As h s  
comprehension continued to decline, his everyday functioning became impaired. 
"For example, on one occasion, A.M. put orange juice in his lasagna and on another, 
" M-Marsel Mesulam, "Dissociative States with Abnormal ~ e m ~ o r d  Lobe EEG: Multiple 
Personality and the Illusion of Possession," Archives ofNeurologv 38 (1981): 176-81; the 
quotation is from 18 1. 
"A. McKay, P. McKenna, P. Bentham, A. Mortimer, A. Holbery, and J. Hodges, 
"SemanticMemory IsImpaired in Schizophrenia,"BiologicalPsychiaby 39 (1996): 929-37. 
" J. McClelland, B. McNaughton, R. O'Reilly,'Why There Arecomplementary Learning 
Systems in the Hippocampus and Neocortex: Insights from the Successes and Failures of 
Connectionist Models of Learning and Memory,"PsychologicalReview 102 (1995): 419-57, 
cited in Kim Graham and John Hodges, "Differentiating the Roles of the Hippocampal 
Complex and the Neocortex in Long-Term Memory Storage: Evidence from the Study of 
Semantic Dementia and Alzheimer's Disease," Neuropsychologv 1 1 (1997): 77-89. 
54 This is summarized from Graham and Hodges, "Differentiating the Roles." 
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brought the lawnmower up to the bathroom when he was asked for a ladder." Brain 
imaging rev& marked atrophy of the inferolateral temporal lobes bilaterally, the 
left more than the right. Subsequent studies have cmfhed an association between 
atrophy of the temporal lobe cortex, especially on the left, and semantic dementia. 
Schizophrenic patients may also have relatively severe compromise of semantic 
knowledge. D. Tamlyn and others showed that of sixty schizophrenic patients, 
"nearly a quarter made significant numbers of errors on sentences like rah haw 
teeth and desks wear In this context, A. McKay and coauthors suggest 
that a "hyperfunctional" semantic memory could explain delusions--a person's 
"knowing" (that is, believing) things that are untrue." We develop this suggestion 
somewhat differently as follows. 
For background to our proposal, we return to the hippocampus. "Within the 
hippocampus itself, we assume that the event or experience is represented by a 
sparse pattern of activity in which the individual neurons represent specific 
combinations or conjunctions of elements of the event that gave rise to the pattem 
of a~tivation."~' These patterns would have arisen from activation of neocortical 
areas representing features of the experience, ultimately feeding into the hqpocarn- 
pus via its primary input source, the entorhinal cortex. The patterns are considered 
to be codes for the conjunctions of features that make up an experienced event. 
In analogy to data compression schemes used for computer files, the information 
contained in neocortical patterns is thought to be redundant, and thus compressible. 
Fewer synapses are needed for storage of the information in the hippocampus than 
in the neocortex. The compressed version is called a ''summary sketch." Compres- 
sion is assumed to occur from the neomrtex to the hippocampus, with decompres- 
sion going the other way. If there are several way stations going in and out-and 
there are, including the perirhd cortex and the parahippocampal -then 
compressiondecompression can be sophisticated. 
When a new event takes place--oonsisting of internal, somatic sensations as well 
as external on-it would first be sparsely represented in a pattern of hippocampal 
connections, then decompressed in temporal cortical regions surrounding the 
hippocampus for transfer to neocortex. The transfer is essentially an interaction 
between temporal cortical patterns and extant widespread neocortical patterns in 
more primary sensory areas. Connectionist models suggest that the throughput to the 
neocortex is straightfornard if global characteristics of the event pattem are already 
shared to a large extent with representations in the neooortex. However, when new 
input is at odds with what is already stored, widespread alterations in the overall 
performance of the neocortical network result. 
We can recast the hippocampal-neocortical interaction as follows. In normal 
circumstances, the continuity of current events with representations ofprior events- 
a match not at the level of "has this single event occurred before?" but at the more 
global level "is this event consistent with all I know?"-takes place sedessly, the 
ongoing, unnoticed internal response being, "yes.. . yes.. . yes." This "yes" is another 
way of describing a straightfornard decompression-a good enough fit--between 
"D. Tamlyn, P. McKcnna. A. Mortimer, C. Lund, S. Hammond, and A. Baddeley, 
"Memory Impairment in Schizophrenia: its Extent, Affiliations and Nturopsychological 
Character," PsychologicaIMedicine 22 (1 992): 101-1 5. Quoted in McKay ct al., ''Semantic 
Memory." 
'' See McKay et al., "Semantic Memory." 
" McClelland et al., "Why There Are Complementary h i n g  Systtms." 423-24. 
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currently formed pattems of synaptic activity in the hippocampus and pre-existing, 
more widespread patterns in sur~oundmg cortices. When an event occurs that does 
not match what we know about the world, it is usual to experience the event as 
unreal, at least transiently. 
We speculate that ongoing global matching is the basis for a background feeling 
of the reality of current experience that is generated by temporal lobe processes. We 
furthermore suggest that global matching is a personal semantic process, meaning 
that it depends on accumulated knowledge of the way events, objects, and the self 
normally relate. Every complex, unique experience can be globally matched ifit can 
be made consistent with some region of the total semantic network that the individual 
has constructed. It is unllkely that a patch of temporal cortex (corresponding to areas 
that are atrophed in patients with semantic dementia) contains all the semantic 
information and relations that an individual possesses. It may be, however, that such 
a patch of cortex is critical in the decompression process, indexing the web of 
relationships that the person has been building throughout h s  or her life by 
accessing the bits and pieces represented elsewhere in widespread regions of cortex. 
We can imagine what would happen if decompression cortices began to behave 
anomalously, as they might in the context of spreading electrical activity fiom the 
nearby hippocampus or amygdala. They might falsely send signals that declare, 
"Current experience has successfully been matched and incorporated into the global 
semantic network." Or they might declare the opposite. In the latter case, the person 
might have a feeling that the event just then occurring is unreal. In the former, he 
would decide that h s  current experience, however unusual, is real. He would then 
be faced with the subsequent problem of incorporating a bit of "real" experience into 
a network with which it is not compatible. The unusual but real-seeming experience 
could be denied access to larger network-walled off in some way-or it could 
force changes in the rest of the semantic economy. 
We do not know what occurs when a real-seeming bit of experience must be 
incorporated into a global semantic network with whch it is incompatible. It is 
possible that the brain might go into a state of widespread, heightened activity when 
it is necessary to update and revise widespread semantic networks in light of an 
anomalous experience. Such widespread revision would probably produce 
heightened metabolic activity throughout the brain as large numbers of synaptic 
connections are moddied, a state that might be experienced as positive. Anecdotally 
at least, when persons who are worlung on a difficult problem suddenly see a new 
way to look at it, a way that forces revision of many of their previous assumptions, 
the experience may be described colloquially as a "rush." 
However, not all unusual experiences that are accepted as real succeed in forcing 
widespread semantic re-organization so as to become integrated into the individual's 
total experience of the world. Mesulam described a series of twelve patients with 
clinical or EEG signs of temporal lobe epilepsy, some of whom developed 
dissociative disorders (commonly known as multiple personality disorders), some 
of whom had delusions of possession, and one of whom had elements of both. Based 
on h s  analysis, he speculated, "It is conceivable that autonomous mental events that 
originate in the nondominant hemisphere are more likely to lead to dissociative 
states, whereas those that originate in the hemisphere dominant for language may be 
more likely to be adopted as part of the self."% There has been no further research 
to shed light on his theory. 
" Mesulam, "Dissociative States," 181. 
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Referring to seizure events, Fenton states, "It is important to note that this altered 
content of consciousness constitutes an intrusion upon the patient's ongoing stream 
of awareness. No matter how vivid, complex or 'real' the ictal experience, the 
patient recognizes that it is an experience imposed upon In other words, 
Fenton holds that most CPS experiences are recognized as nonreal by the patients. 
When an individual has a series of experiences that occur in stereotyped fashlon 
many times, it is to be expected that he or she would learn to label these as seizures. 
However, it is apparent that at least some epileptic individuals do embrace their 
experiences as real. We speculate that what makes the difference between cases such 
as those described by Fenton and those described by Mesulam is how the seizure 
activity affects the anterior temporal cortex, and hence the global matching process 
that underlies the conviction of reality. 
Discrete experiences of ultimacy probably involve the automatic attempt to 
match the unusual experience with the person's total global semantic network. At 
this point, the experience could be rejected as "not real," in which case it would not 
acheve the status of ultimacy. To be an experience of ultimacy, the event must be 
stamped with what James called "conviction." In analogy to altered experiences of 
familiarity, we believe the conviction of reality can occur anomalously when neural 
discharge spreads to the cortical areas that perform global semantic matchmg. In 
general, however, the threshold for a match would depend on the contents of 
previously stored memories and concepts, as well as on the activation of temporal 
cortical decompression mechanisms. In a religiously acculturated individual with 
previous ultimacy experiences, the neural threshold for a conviction of the reality of 
any given ultimacy experience might be quite low. In a person with no previous 
religious experience or concepts, the unusual experience might have to be "pushed 
through" by activation of temporal lobe global matching mechanisms; conditions 
favoring large-scale plasticity of semantic representations in more posterior cortices 
would also favor global matching in such a case. When a match results due to any 
of these factors, the individual not only might have (for example) a feeling of 
extraordinary tranquility and a loss of the sense of the individual self, but he or she 
would also have the sense that "This-however unusual it seerns-is mal." 
Although we can imagine how alterations in the conviction of reality might be 
effected by mechanisms such as the one proposed here, we do not thereby prejudge 
discrete experiences of ultimacy and attendant convictions of reality simply as a 
breakdown of the neural machinery for accurate judgment. In both everyday 
experiences and ultimacy experiences, the brain's activity in attempting global 
matches is likely to be at least as "artful" (to use the terminology of ethno- 
methodologists) as social practices are in establishing consensual reality. To see 
brains as either true or flawed mirrors of nature demes the continuous processes of 
engagement that characterize the relations between brains and the worlds in whlch 
they operate. Global matching must depend on neural processes underlying 
decompression, in interaction with the representations already available in other 
cortical areas for the assimilation of the current experience, representations that are 
themselves subject to alteration by the experience. 
In the terminology of religious reports of discrete altered states, it is not unusual 
for an individual to have first a complex sensory experience (such as the conviction 
of a presence together with a feeling of awe or ecstasy) succeeded closely by the 
revision of all p M o u s  understandings of a certain kind. That is, the previous 
' 9  Fenton, "Psychiatric Disorders of Epilepsy," 17. 
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way around, the thud-person identity is lost. A mind without a body must be 
experienced in a Merent way than ordrnary persons, as a Merent kind of being. 
Furthermore, in mystical or religious experience, it is usual for a presence to be only 
vaguely or not at all localized in space. 
3.5 Chronic Personaliiy Changes Rehted to Temporal Lobe Pathology 
A syndrome of chronic characterological features has been describedin persons with 
temporal lobe epilepsy. Since it is present in the absence of acute electrical activity 
(the "ictus"), it is termed interictal personality. 
The syndrome includes the following features: increased concern with philosophical, 
moral or religious issues, often in striking contrast to the patient's educational back- 
ground, an increased rate of religious conversions (or strongly justified, rather than casual, 
lack of religious feeling), hypergraphia (a tendency to highly detailed writing often of a 
religious or philosophical nature), hyposexuality (diminished sex drive sometimes 
associated with changes in sexual taste), and irritability of varying degree.63 
David Bear reviewed previous studies of sixty-nine patients who had developed 
psychotic symptoms on the average of fourteen years after the onset of seizures as 
follows: 
ABective disturbance was "shown by all patients," most frequently a deepening of 
emotion ... and preserved affective intensity. Delusional ideas appeared in 67 out of 69 
patients, mystical religious conceptions being extremely common. Paranoid feelings and 
explanatory systems justified a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia in 46 patients ... 
Hallucinations occurred in 63 patients, typically consisting of formed visual images or 
conversational phrases experienced with intense emotional significance (e.g., a vision of 
Christ on the Cross in the sky, the voice of God saying, "You will be healed, your tears 
have been seen.'- 
In a subsequent paper, Bear and his coauthors wrote, 
The summary traits which most powerfully differentiated temporal lobe epileptics 
from a mixed psychiatric group were excessive interpersonal clinging (viscosity), 
repetitive preoccupation with peripheral details (circumstantiality), religious and 
philosophical preoccupations, humorless sobriety, tendency to paranoid over-interpreta- 
tion, and moralistic  concern^.^' 
The authors also remarked on these patients' "propensity to write extensively- 
diaries, notebooks, novels, or biographes," noting that this writing often has a 
cosmological or moral tone. (Whlle Bear's descriptions are widely accepted, not all 
authors agree with h s  characterizations of the interictal per~onality.~~) To explain the 
63 Normk~eschwind,  "Behavioural Changes in Temporal Lobe Epilepsy,"Psychological 
Medicine 9 (1979): 217-19; quotation is on 217. 
"David Bear, "Temporal Lobe Epilepsy-A Syndrome of Sensory-Limbic Hyper- 
connection,"Cortex 15 (1979): 357-84; quotation, 363. Reviewed were E. Slater and P.A.P. 
Moran, "The Schizophrenic-Like Psychoses of Epilepsy: Relation Between Ages of Onset," 
British Journal ofpsychiaby 115 (1969): 599400; E. Slater and A.W. Beard, "Schizo- 
phrenia-Like Psychoses of Epilepsy," British Journal ofPJychiahy 109 (1963): 95-150. 
6J David Bear, K. Levin, D. Blumer, D. Chetham, and J. Ryder, "Interictal Behaviour in 
Hospitalised Temporal Lobe Epileptics: Relationship to Idiopathic Psychiatric Syndromes," 
Journal ofNeurologv, Neurosurgery, and Psychiaby 45 (1982): 481-88. 
66 For example, see Dan Mungas, "Interictal Behavior Abnormality in Temporal Lobe 
Epilepsy,"Archives ofGeneralPsychia~ 39 (1 982): 108-1 1; David M. Tucker, R. Novelly, 
and P. Walker, "Hyperreligiosity in Temporal Lobe Epilepsy: Redefining the Relationship," 
Journal ofNervous and Mental Disease 175 (1 987): 1 8 1-84. 
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interictal personality, Bear speculated that recwrent seizure activity in medial 
temporal lobe structures causes aberrant synaptic connections to form, resulting in 
what he termed "sensory limbic hyperconnection." He theorized that these 
hyperconnections give rise to an overinvestment of perception and thought with 
affective sigmticance. 
Recently, in a preliminary study of two epileptic patients with religious 
preoccupations, V.S. Ramachandran and his colleagues detected unusually intense 
autonomic responses to religious images, while other images that usually provoke 
autonomic activity-such as sexual and violent material-produced less response 
than in normal subjects. These findings suggest that if hyperconnectivity is 
responsible for features of the interictal personality, it acts selectively: such new 
circuits might produce "new peaks and valleys in the patients' emotional 
land~cape."~' Although the new landscape might yield pronounced religious felmgs, 
thls does not prove that there are circuits potentially dedicated to religious belief in 
normal brains. It is possible, as Ramachandran points out, that certain more general- 
purpose emotional circuits are simply conducive to religious experience when 
selectively potentiated. 
We consider below, in section 7, the question as to whether the interictal 
personality belongs within the category of extended experiences of ultimacy. 
3.6 Neurological Considerations Rekant to Socialiiy 
Social participation enters into our neural description of ultimacy experiences at 
several levels. First, the phenomena of ultimacy are rendered intelligible and 
meaningful to the individual experiencing them by means of the social-linguistic 
systems of his or her group. We explored above how specialized groups, using their 
particular systems, interpret aspects of what might be theologically termed divine 
action in the form of experiences of ultimacy. Second, under the heading of extended 
ultimacy experiences, we have considered moral transformations of the individual 
occurring, for example, in dialogue with a mentor. We have said that the fundarnen- 
tal feature of character transformation is the ability to enter into a proffered social- 
hguistic framework, consequently changing the self by participation in a new moral 
order. In both cases, social participation is essential. 
The neurobiology of human social participation is beginning to be under~tood.~ 
In the course of primate evolution, certain structures that had linked olfaction with 
social behavior became much more &verse in their connections and differentiated 
in their architecture. As ancestral primates became diurnal instead of nocturnal, used 
vision to receive social signals and expressive faces to send them, and lived in more 
complex social groups, these brain structures correspondingly received input fiom 
more extended cortical regions and were able to generate more intricate behavioral 
responses. A specialization for social coption appears to involve brain areas that 
process faces-especially the cortex of the temporal lobes-and deeper structures 
such as the amygdala and orbital fiontal cortex, together with those parts of the 
fiontal cortex that evaluate complex and rapidly shifting contexts. The sophisticated 
deployment of these circuits is best seen in the demanding face-to-face situation 
known as conversation. 
67 V.S. Ramachandran and Sandra Blakeslee, Phantoms in h e  Brain: Probing h e  
Mysteries of h e  Human Mind (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1998), 188. 
" See Brothers, Friday's Footprint. 
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The brain structures that subserve social participation are conduits for the 
transmission of symbolic systems between individuals. Defects in their function 
would prevent acculturation of the individual by preventing social participation. 
Terrence Deacon comments that social attention is crucial for the acquisition of 
symbols, and discusses the role of the prefrontal cortex in recruiting attention to 
social stimuli.'j9 He also gives great emphasis to the role of the prefrontal cortex in 
constructing the distributed mnemonic architecture that supports symbolic 
referencenot just in relation to language, but in relation to human cognition in 
general, for cognition requires the ongoing construction of novel symbolic 
 relationship^.^ We saw earlier that the matching of current experience with stored 
semantic memory is likely to involve the temporal lobe cortex. How the hc t ions  of 
this cortex may relate to the prefrontal symbolic system hypothesized by Deacon is 
still not known. Nevertheless, we have the outlines of a neural system that enables 
social communication in the first instance and storage of acquired semantic 
categories subsequently. Such a system would make pedagogy possible, and 
probably must be intact in order for characterological transformation under the 
influence of social learning to occur. 
Even less well understood, but mentioned here for the sake ofcompleteness, are 
innate propensities for imitation, seen within minutes ofbirth in human infants. The 
rapid and seemingly automatic spread of certain behaviors in groups has been 
observed in many species of animals, as well as in human beings. Social contagion 
is observed in human infants in the phenomenon of so-called "contagious crylng" 
that occurs in nurseries. Clues to the neural mechanisms for such behavior may 
reside in "mirror neurons" studied in monkeys. These "subjectless" neurons fire in 
response to certain actions both when they are viewed by the animal subject and 
when performed by it7' Certain discrete ultimacy states such as trances and mystical 
ecstasy seem to be facilitated by group participation. These, then, constitute a further 
instance of the role of social participation in generating experiences of ultimacy. 
4 Social-Aychologisal Considerations 
Experiences of ultimacy can be described from many points of view, each involving 
characteristic terminology and usually presupposing the social-linguistic framework 
of some social context.72 These contexts and vocabularies may be vernacular or 
professional, religious or secular, theological or nontheological. We need to examine 
as many thought systems as possible for observations relevant to the multi-faceted 
model of ultimacy experiences that we propose in section 7. In practice, however, 
there are two limitations. On the one hand, we have space only to discuss a few 
lenses through which human beings observe themselves and which can be used to 
69 Terrence Deacon, The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution ofLanguage and the Brain 
(New York: Norton, 1997), 272. 
" G. Rizzolatti, L. Fadiga, V. Gallese, and L. Fogassi, "Premotor Cortex and the 
Recognition of Motor Actions," Cognitive Brain Research 3 (1996): 13 1 4  I .  
72 We have found the sociolonv of religion im~ortant for understanding the social- 
-- - ~ " - -  - 
psychological considerations relevant to ultimacy experiences, particularly works influenced 
by the sociology of knowledge such as Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social 
Consbuction ofReality: A Treatise in the ~ociologv i f  ~ n o w l e d ~ e  (~arden City: Doubleday, 
1966); and Berger's The Sacred Canopy. 
378 WESLEY WILDMAN & LESLIE BROTHERS 
describe ultimacy experiences (usually under other descriptions, of course). On the 
other hand, we are limited by not being participants in all such systems. This means 
that, for any given thought system, we may only turn up a small sample of ideas and 
observations relevant to experiences of ultimacy. In principle thls limitation can be 
overcome through deeper participation, but we have dealt with it by trying to limit 
ourselves to systems with which we have some fa~niliarity.~~ 
A number of insights from psychoanalysis have bearing on an adequate understand- 
ing of the role of social-linguistic systems in mediating ultimacy experiences. 
Early Development. First, be-g with Sigmund Freud, psychoanalytic 
theorists have postulated psychological developmental stages through which children 
naturally progress. The idea of developmental stages provides a richly descriptive 
framework for characterizing the various ways in which self, other, and the world 
may be experienced. Adults are viewed as the products of developmental presses ,  
with highly individual and more or less successful outcomes. Freud's scheme of 
stages of libidinal de~elopment~~ has been succeeded by others such as those of 
Margaret Mahler's separation-inchviduation scheme75 and Heinz Kohut's focus on 
narcissism and the self.76 William M e i ~ s n e r ~ ~  and Ana-Maria R i ~ z u t o ~ ~  have 
thoughtfully elaborated some connections between such stages and the possibilities 
for experiences of faith. These later psychoanalyhc theorists have tended to remain 
neutral to the question of the cause of experiences of ultimacy, while providing rich 
psychological frameworks within which the potently transfornative effects of 
ultimacy experiences can be understood. 
Subject and Object. Second, D.W. Winnicott has written on the transitional 
object, that part of experience that is in between being self and not-self. In a telling 
sentence, he says, "In the rules of the game we all know that we will never challenge 
the baby to elicit an answer to the question: did you create that or chd you find it?lm 
The position suggested by this quotation has interesting implications for interpreting 
personal experiences of ultimacy because it provides a way of understanding how 
" We think that sociology of knowledge and other sociological lines of analysis would offer 
especially important perspectives on ultimacy experiences. For example, there appear to be 
significant correlations between socioeconomic status and the types of ultimacy experiences 
that typically occur, suggesting that economic and class analysis could be quite fruitful. 
" Sigmund Freud, Inboductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, Part 111, General Theory 
of the Neuroses, in The StandardEdition of the Complete Psychological Works ofSigmund 
Freud, J .  Strachey, ed. (London: The Hogarth Press, 1963; first published in 1917). 
'' Margaret S. Mahler, The Psychological Birth of the Human Injhnt: Symbiosis and 
Individuation (New York: Basic Books, 1975). 
l6 Heinz Kohut, The Analysis of the S e p  A Systematic Approach to the Psychoanalytic 
Treabnent ofNarcissistic PersonalityDisorders (New York: International Universities Press, 
1971). 
l7 William W. Meissner, Psychoanalysis and Religious Experience (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1984). 
Ana-Maria Rizzuto, The Birth of the Living God: A Psychoanalytic Study (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1979). 
l9 D.W. Winnicott, "The Use of an Object and Relating Through Identifications," in 
Playing and Reality (New York: Basic Books, 1971), 89. 
RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCES 379 
ultimacy experiences could be both within the self and h m  outside. Faith can be 
thought of as the suspension of the question, "Did you create that (revelatory 
experience) or d d  you find it?" 
Winnicott's ideas have been further elaborated by Christopher Bollas in the 
concept of a transformational object, "[a person, place, event, ideology] that 
promises to transform the self."s0 This concept resonates with temporally extended 
experiences of ultimacy in the form of conversion or character transformation 
mediated through a relationship with symbols, rituals, or other persons. As is the 
case with other psychoanalytic W a s ,  these theorists illumine the transformative 
power of ultimacy experiences. But the power of the ideas of transitional objects and 
trandknational objects to explain personal transformation also indicates sometiung 
about the social-linguistic entanglements of such experiences: they are crucially 
linked both with the internal world of the person and with their social-linguistic 
milieu. The objects of ultimacy experiences function as transitional and transfor- 
mational objects. 
Spiritual Guide. Third, although the term "spiritual guide" is alien to the 
vocabulary of psychoanalysis, the relationship between the analyst and analysandhas 
received much attention, with results that might enrich a more traditionally 
theological framework concerned with the role of a spiritual mentor or a non- 
theological scheme of moral development involving a mentor. The key point is that 
"The analyst at the outset and throughout the work functions not simply on what he 
observes the patient is, but on what he both infers and implies the patient might 
become, that is, someone with a capacity for realizing further ego gro~th."~ '  On the 
basis of this insight, a number of concepts have been advanced to capture how the 
analysand's relation to the analyst produces meaningful change: workmg alliance, 
therapeutic alliance, transference, transference neurosis, the holding environment, 
the transformational object, and others. Radrnila Moacanin has also drawn a parallel 
between the classical guru, or "spiritual hend," and the psychoanaly~t.~~ These 
insights of psychoanalytic theorists are most relevant to temporally extended 
ultimacy experiences. The "spiritual guide" serves as a trusted source of wisdom by 
which the social-linguistic environment of the one undergoing transformation is 
enriched and extended in efficacious ways. This underlines the importance for 
transformation ultimacy experiences of both flexibility within social-linguistic 
frameworks and established wisdom about appropriate patterns of social-linguistic 
change. Personal transformation without social-lingustic flexibility is impossible, 
and change without the regulation of established wisdom is precarious. 
Discernment. Fourth, some of the psychoanalyst's activities are similar to 
religious discernment (see below for a discussion of the latter). Presentations of 
clinical cases often center on critical evaluative moments in which the analyst 
dscernsthat a bit of unconscious material has been brought to light. Here is a typical 
example, regarding a patient whose elder brother had died when he was three and 
who had been unable to reach the analyst by phone during a previous missed session. 
The analyst writes, "I pondered and puzzled, wondering why on earth he was 
'O Christopher Bollas, "The Transformational Object," International Journal of 
Psychoanalysis 60 (1979): 97-107; quotation is on 14. 
'' W. Poland, "On the Analyst's Neutrality," Journal of the American Psychoanalytic 
Association 32 (1984): 283-99; quotation is on 296, italics in original. 
Radmila Moacanin, Jung 's Psychology and Tibetan Buddhism: Western and Eastern 
Paths to the Heart (London: Wisdom Publications, 1986), 56-58. 
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relieved once he had got through to my secretary. Then the truth struck me, 'Ah, of 
course, he was relieved that I was not dead'. I communicated this to him and he 
immedately assented. We both realized how great was his anxiety that I would suffer 
the fate of his elder brother."" Now, this example does not involve ultimacy 
experiences, but analytic discernment is a basic preoccupation of the psychoanalflc 
community that applies to all patient experiences, including ultimacy experiences. 
Analytic discernment presupposes both that there are unconscious truths to be 
discovered and that it is not so easy to figure out what those truths are. Criteria for 
having discovered unconscious truths include not only the assent of the patient, but 
also his or her subsequent behavior, dreams, and other communications. The 
psychoanalyst's role as an expert in discernment underlines the hermeneutical 
complexity of the social-linguistic systems within whch ultimacy experiences must 
be interpreted. Ths complexity makes discernment vital in the identification of 
ultimacy experiences either within religious groups, in the ongoing conversations 
with spiritual advisors, or in self-evaluation. The meanings of ultimacy experiences 
are thus typically far from obvious and require as much discernment as  does the 
identification of unconscious truths in the psychoanalytic context. 
Based on all that has been said, it seems to us that ultimacy experiences cannot 
be understood in isolation from a rich appreciation of human dependence on the 
conceptual-linguistic conditions of the social environments in whch people live and 
change. The previous points express various aspects of this social-linguistic 
conditioning from a psychoanalytic perspective. But both discrete and temporally 
extended ultimacy experiences call for a discussion of the provenance of ultimacy 
experiences in psychoanalytic (as well as other) terms. Psychoanalysis is relevant to 
this issue in at least two ways. 
Role of an External Fome or Power. First, one of the key tenets of psychoanaly- 
sis is that the unconscious is dynamic, producing effects on conscious life and 
behavior. In this sense it acts as an external power over which the individual has no 
control. James wrote, "since on our hypothesis it is primarily the higher faculties of 
our own hidden mind which are controlling, the sense of union with the power 
beyond us is a sense of something, not merely apparently, but literally true."84 The 
connection James envisaged between the dynamism of the uncomious or "hdden 
mind" and the religious idea of "higher" control is fascinating and important. On the 
surface it may seem to be unduly reductive of ultimacy experiences, but we think this 
would be a hasty conclusion. To identify the unconscious as a locus of ultimacy 
experiences merely indicates in psychoanalyt~c terms a part-condition for ultimacy 
experiences to occur without thereby also demonstrating that there can be no 
authentic encounter with ultimacy mediated by unconscious dynamics. 
Experiences of Loss of Selj: Second, experiences of depersonalization or merger 
states take place in psychoanalytic treatments. These experiences are typically 
rendered in narrative form using such concepts as drives, self-states, or regressions 
to earlier developmental stages. An example is J.M. Masson's account of the 
"oceanic feeling"s5 and other psychoanalflc accounts of the sense of reunion with 
" Neville Symington, "Psychoanalysis: A Servant of Truth," in The Analytic Experience 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), 15-24. Quotation is on 18. 
James, Varieties, 503. 
'' J.M. Masson, The Oceanic Feeling: The Origins ojReligious Sentiment in Ancient 
India (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1980). 
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an omnipotent force.* Here we see a correlation between psychoanalytic and 
religious categories that once again raises the specter of reductionism. The same 
argument as in the previous point also applies here, however: to render religious 
descriptions of ultimacy experiences in psychoanalytic categories is not to reduce the 
former but simply to redescribe them. Such redescriptions and corre1ations are the 
way that religious language about ultimacy experiences is connected with other 
social-linguistic spheres. Such connections are to be desired for the intelligibility 
they bring to religious categories. To achieve the dual result that religious categories 
are utterly superfluous and actually misleading through invoking the influence of 
imaginary entities would require more than just convincing translations between 
social-linguistic frameworks. In fact, we do not see how any amount of psychoana- 
l@c theory would be capable of establishing such a result. 
4.2 Life-Stage Bychology 
There are a number of insights into ultimacy experiences to be gained from the 
psychology of life stages. 
Aduk Development. Eric Enkson extended the psychoanalytic idea of develop- 
mental stages into adulthood. Two such stages are generativity and ego integrity. 
"Generativity is primarily the interest in establishing and guiding the next generation 
or whatever in a given case may become the absorbing object of a parental kind of 
responsibility." A failure to achieve generativity results in stagnation. Ego integrity 
involves "a post-narcissistic love of the human ego-not of the self-as an 
experience which conveys some world order and spiritual sense, no matter how 
dearly paid for ... The lack or loss of this accrued ego integration is signdied by fear 
of death."87 These concepts are usehl for describing a gradually achieved personal 
transformation in conjunction with experiences of ultimacy. 
Spiritual Development. Stephen Happel and James Walt# cite the work of 
Lawrence Kohlberg on cognitive-moral developmentEg; they show that James 
Fowler's description of stages of faith development is a further elaboration of 
Kohlberg's account.90 Following Fowler, they conclude that religious conversion 
depends on innate ontogenetic structures that unfold in an invariant way during 
devel~prnent.~' Both E h o n  andFowler offer insights into human development over 
the course of life that are important for understandmg temporally extended ultimacy 
experiences. Specifically, we learn that the meaning oftemporally extended ultimacy 
experiences shifts with age and spiritual experience. These are further factors 
modlfylng the social-linguistic conditions for the understanding and expression of 
temporally extended experiences of ultimacy. 
" Otto Fenichel, The Psychoanalytic Theoy ofNeumsis (New York: W.W. Norton, 1945), 
40. 
" E. Erikson, "The Eight Stages of Man," in Childhood andsociety (New York: Norton, 
1950), 23 1 .  
Stephen Happel and James Walter, Conversion and Discipleship: A Christian 
Foundation for Ethics and Dockine (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1980). 
a9 Lawrence Kohlberg, Essays on Moral Development, Vol. I ,  The Philosophy ojMoral 
Development (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1981). 
90 James Fowler, Stages ofFaith: The Psychology ofHuman Development and the Quest 
for Meaning (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1981). 
9' Happel and Walter, Conversion and Discipleship, 54-60. 
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Death. Some kinds of discrete ultimacy experiences can be usefully framed 
w i t h  the vicissitudes of adult development, especially the approaching end of life. 
Persinger thematizes the issue as follows: 
God Exwriences.. . are precipitated by personal crises, such as the loss of a loved one 
. . 
(real or imagined) or the confrontation bf an insoluble problem. Certainly the greatest 
insoluble ~roblem is the antici~ation of selfextinction. Death anxiety increases in 
incrementh steps as the person 'ages and approaches the latter portion of life. God 
Experiences proliferate during these periods and may even occur as death-bed episodes. 
The God Experience is followed by a remarkable anxiety reduction and a positive 
anticipation of the future?' 
4.3 Evolutionary Aychology 
The basic tenet of evolutionary psychology is that the human mind evolved in 
response to the demands of a hunting and gathering way of life so as to increase 
reproductive fitness through avoiding predation, assisting kin, findmg a mate, and 
so on.'' Moral behavior is explained in this theory by the need to promote 
r e l a t i h p s  based onreciprocity, with the effect that the individual represses selfish 
behavior in favor of altruistic behavior. Evolutionary psychologists speculate that 
there are universal deep structures for moral beliefs due to common patterns of kin 
and reciprocity relationships in the environment of evolutionary adaptation. They 
also invoke self-deception, akm to the psychoanalytic concept of repression, as a 
means for disguising to oneself one's own selfish interests, in the service of making 
selfless acts appear more convincing to othersg4 
These ideas have relevance for both discrete and temporally extended ultimacy 
experiences. On the one hand, the evolutionary-psychological inducements for 
having certain beliefs and behaviors may be sufticiently strong in some cases to 
predispose people to discrete ultimacy experiences that are capable of forgmg or 
s o l i w g  such adaptive beliefs and behaviors. This is speculative but hghly 
probable in view of the development in at least human beings of a rich emotional 
life, one of whose effects is precisely the predisposing of people to certain beliefs 
and behaviors. Discrete ultimacy experiences would seem to be nothing more than 
a special case of this more general process. On the other hand, the insights of 
evolutionary psychology are important for understandmg the processes of character 
transformation and increased integration into the moral-social order that are 
characteristic of temporally extended experiences of ultimacy. Complex social 
organizations wdl be most adaptive when stable conformation of individual members 
to social rules and commitments is achieved. In such social environments, 
conversion and character transformation naturally take on special sigdicance. 
9' Persinger, Neumpsychological Bases of God Beliefi, 2. 
93 Leda Cosmides, J. Tooby, and J. Barkow, "Introduction" in The Adapted Mind: 
Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture, J.H. Barkow, L. Cosmides, J. 
Tooby, eds. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 3-15. 
R. Nesse, A. Lloyd, "The Evolution of Psychodynamic Mechanisms," in The Adapted 
Mind, Barkow, Cosmides, and Tooby, eds., 601-24. 
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A number of theological or ethical perspectives are relevant to ultimacy 
experiences.95 Ultimacy experiences are often referred to in stories with theological 
or ehca l  overtones (the story of the Buddha's calling and enlightenment, for 
example). Ultimacy experiences are also presupposed by some theological or ethical 
concepts (such as Zen's satori or Judaism's repentance). These narrative and 
conceptual ways of invoking ultimacy experiences are theologically and ethically 
loaded especially for the groups withm which such narratives and concepts play key 
roles. This makes the experiences presupposed in the narratives and concepts 
expected and intelligible in those groups. Moreover, people typically describe their 
ultimacy experiences in terms of the narratives and concepts of their group and the 
suffusion of such nwratives through the shared practices of a group may help to 
induce the occurrence of particular ultimacy experiences. All of this occurs in part 
because these narratives and concepts probably encode with tolerable accuracy, in 
the specialized language of the group, the group's collected wisdom about the way 
ultimacy experiences occur and the sorts of transformations their occurrence can 
induce. In what follows, we discuss these dynamics in relation to theological 
concepts and narratives (5. l), ehca l  concepts and nwratives (5.2), and the way 
experiences are expressed in language (5.3). Finally, we comment (in 5.4) on the 
almost ubiquitous yet highly varied processes of discernment that regulate the 
application of theological and ethical ideas to the ultimacy experiences of individuals 
within a religious group. 
5.1 Theological Conceptr and Narratives 
Specifically theological concepts active w i t h  the social-linguistic environment of 
a religious group are assigned meanings usually by means of narratives that express 
the typical experience of group members. These concepts and nwratives fiequently 
presuppose that ultimacy experiences of the discrete or extended variety should 
occur on particular occasions as the nwrative is lived out or in particular ways as 
dictated by the narrative's key concepts. One example drawn fiom Christianity will 
suffice to make the point concrete. 
The narratives and concepts associated with the Christian understanding of 
salvation indicate that a process of salvation typically is accompanied by a number 
of discrete and extended ultimacy experiences. There should be a sharp conscious- 
ness of guilt for past weakness and sin, along with a sense of being invited by God 
(specifically by Jesus Christ or the Holy Spirit) to confess such weakness and sin, an 
overwhelming sense of peace associated with belief in the biblical promise that God 
forgives through Jesus Chnst when true confession is made, a felt need to be with 
other Christian people and to be sustained by the sacrament of the Eucharist or Holy 
Communion, an unaccountable increase in love and tolerance for other people, and 
a powerful urge to share what has occurred with those both familiar and unfamiliar 
with it. 
Any given experience may vary from h s  narrative statement of the typical 
process in two ways. On the one hand, some of the implied ultirnacy experiences 
may occur for some people but not others. In the process of group discernment (see 
'' George Ellis in his essay for this volume takes up a similar theme in relation to aesthetic 
experiences and experiences of love (we classify these as socially extended ultimacy 
experiences bearing especially on orientation). 
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5.4 below) of authentic salvation, for instance, conformation to the overall sweep of 
the narrative typically is deemed more important than the report of a particular, 
spectacular ultimacy experience. On the other hand, some groups value certain 
specdic types of experiences that others value less, and the narratives vary across 
groups accordingly. So Pentecostal Christian groups typically (and thus with 
variations) expect salvation to be accompanied by glossolalia (so-called "speaking 
in tongues"); Pietist Christian groups typically emphasize the confession and 
behavioral change phases; Catholic Christians typically stress the role of the 
sacraments; and Evangelical Christian groups care more than most about the desire 
to share the good news of salvation with others-and there are significant variations 
w i t h  each of these types of groups. 
In h s  way, the concept of salvation is stabilized and spreads through a religious 
group, though with the variations noted. To the extent that there is a shared history 
of cornmentarial or devotional literature or a body of narratives enshrined in a 
common sacred text such as the Bible or universally used rituals, a theological idea 
can spread to many different groups and acquire different nuances in each context.% 
The history of an idea, its spreading and its variations, is the essential background 
for hying to make sense of theological descriptions of ultimacy experiences. With 
this background in place, many theological concepts and narratives can be richly 
informative about ultimacy experiences and the ways they are described. Without 
h s  background, theological language cannot be penetrated very far and analyses of 
ultimacy experiences depending on theological concepts will be limited by the 
perspective of those concepts with no way either to discern the nature of the 
limitation or to overcome it. This is a daunting caveat on the usefulness of theology 
for interpreting ultimacy experiences because the spread and modification of 
theological ideas is a complex subject. Much work has been done in this area, 
however, so it is safe to say that, with care, theology can offer genuine insights into 
the character of ultimacy experiences. 
5.2 Ethical Concepts and Narratives 
Many ehca l  concepts intimate ultimacy experiences in much the same way that 
some theological concepts do. The Confucian account of the virtues of human- 
heartedness (jen) and ritual propriety (li) involves such an ethical narrati~e.~' There 
are staple literary themes with ehca l  import, such as the dramatic crisis of 
conscience or the process of character transformation described in Emma (see p. 
363, above). Other examples might be drawn fiom political or activist groups such 
as Greenpeace or Amnesty International, in which the social texture is rich and 
focused enough to support complex narratives involving stages of commitment and 
risk in the fbrthering of the group's aims. The movement through these increasingly 
demanding stages of commitment is accompanied by changes of values and self- 
understanding; many of these can be described as transformation ultimacy 
experiences. Moreover, discrete ultimacy experiences may occur as this process of 
% This way of thinking about the spread of ideas is akin to epidemiological analysis of the 
spread of  diseases; this analogy is exploited in Dan Sperber, Explaining Culture: A 
Naturalistic Approach (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996). 
97 Note, however, that many contemporary interpreters of Confucianism, especially those 
indebted to the vision of Neoconfucianism, readily treat these ethical concepts and the 
narratives framing them as essentially religious. 
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increasingly risky and challenging commitment proceeds; testimonials kom within 
such groups suggest that they do." 
There is an important double Merence between theological and ethical 
narratives. On the one hand, narratives expressing ethical concepts are less clearly 
defined and less widespread within and across cultures than theological narratives. 
This means that specific narratives will typically be less useful for furnishing ethlcal 
descriptions of ultimacy experiences than is the case with theological descriptions. 
Also, ethlcal descriptions will tend to use ethical terms in a more ad hoc way. On the 
other hand, ethical concepts are more deeply embedded in the language and 
practices of groups across cultures than most theological concepts. Every culture has 
variations on the conceptual themes of good and bad, loyalty, kindness, generosity, 
and honesty because these come with any form of social togetherness. Theological 
concepts are culturally more refined and diverse, by comparison; the cross-cultural 
diversity in conceptions of divinity or salvation is extreme. That means that ethical 
narratives are actually needed less to focus ethical concepts than theological 
narratives are needed to give meaning to theological concepts. It also means that 
ethlcal descriptions of ultimacy experiences will tend to draw less on highly 
structured narratives and more on universally r ecopab le  ethical ideas, even if 
those ideas vary in content from context to context. 
This double difference offers an advantage and a &sadvantage to the analyst of 
ultimacy experiences. The advantage is that understandmg the complexities of the 
spread and modification of ideas is a less crucial precondition for making use of 
ethical descriptions of ultimacy experiences than is the case for theological 
descriptions. The corresponding disadvantage is that it is harder to tie down 
precisely what is meant in an ethical description of an ultimacy experience without 
a highly structured narrative to guide interpretation. It follows that the insights 
offered by ethical descriptions will tend to be helpful in a relatively vague way for 
understanding ultimacy experiences. 
Finally, ethical perspectives on ultimacy experiences are most directly relevant 
to understanding extended ultimacy experiences, especially of the transformation 
lund, for obvious reasons. They are relatively less useful for aiding interpretation of 
discrete ultimacy experiences where moral status is kequently unclear. This 
constitutes both a limitation on the contribution of ethics to interpreting ultimacy 
experiences and an indication of its great strength. 
5.3 Erpressing Experiences of UEfimacy in Language 
Rehind the scenes in what has been said so far about the contribution of theology and 
ethics to understandmg ultimacy experiences is a famous problem that has haunted 
the phenomenology of religion for years: the development of criteria capable of 
detecting when dissimilar reports describe phenomenologically similar religious 
experiences. So dramatic is this problem in relation to theology that, at present, there 
is every reason to expect neurally and phenomenologically identical experiences to 
be describable in such different theological terms that the lurlung identity would 
remain undetectable. Theorists have advanced methods proposing to circumvent this 
* The occurrence of ultimacy experiences in individual members of groups with striking 
ethical commitments and potent ethical narratives is worthy of close examination; we have not 
investigated literature on this subject to discover if anything along these lines has already been 
attempted. 
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limitation on ordinary human communication, from Husserl's philosophical 
phenomenology to Daniel Dennett's heterophenomenological method.99 Carrying out 
the methods is acult at best, however, and the problem only seems to grow more 
pointed as cross-cultural knowledge deepens. 
This problem of relativism of description of religious experiences is compounded 
in theological and ethical contexts by the fact that the specialized concepts 
presupposing or referring to religious experiences (for example, conversion, 
samaclhi, salvation, and human-heartedness) are themselves hard to compare. This 
second kind of dficulty in comparison is no easier to manage than the phenomeno- 
logical dficulty just mentioned and, predictably, methods for attempting to manage 
it have proliferated. loo 
We have several remarks to make about the relativity of description of ultimacy 
experiences. First, the issue is complex and this complexity must be faced if a theory 
of ultimacy experiences is to have standing in a broad public of intellectuals. In 
relation to narrower social contexts, such as a particular theological-intellectual 
tradition w i t h  Hinduism, some of the approaches to comparison that focus solely 
on the theological categories used for describing ultimacy experiences do seem to 
succeed in exposing such descriptions to judgments of similarity and difference.I0' 
The same can be said for some of the approaches to comparing descriptive 
phenomenological accounts.'02 The problem is sharpest and most threatening when 
the intellectual context of discussion is broadly interdisciplinary and cross-cultural. 
Second, theories about the neural expression of-ultimacy experiences in 
conjunction with improving technologies for mapping brain activity promise a 
heretofore underappreciated means of testing claims that dissimilar descriptions refer 
to similar experiences. Such testing would be far from simple, as it must presuppose 
correlations between neurology and the phenomenology of experience that are in fact 
llkely to be related no more strictly than in family resemblance fashion. Nevertheless, 
research indicates that such correlations exist and that a few areas of the brain tend 
to be involved in discrete ultimacy states, so neural scans should in time have a 
statistically relevant contribution to make. 
Third, theories about religious language have a role to play here, the more so 
when they join considerations from neurology and the sociology of knowledge, as 
well as other disciplines such as comparative ethology and linguistics. Religious 
groups adopt patterns of description of ultimacy experiences under several 
99 See Daniel C. Dennett, "A Method for Phenomenology," in Consciousness Explained 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1991), 66-98. 
IW For a survey of such methods, see Wesley J. Wildman with Robert Cummings Neville, 
"How Our Approach to Comparison Relates to Others," in Ultimate Realities, Neville, ed. 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, forthcoming, 2000). 
'I The book cited in the previous note is the second of three volumes in a series devoted 
to testing a particularly sophisticated comparative method, the series is the published output 
of the Cross-Cultural Comparative Religious Ideas Project, already mentioned in footnote 4. 
This project presents strong evidence on behalf of the effectiveness of a comparative method 
that establishes a dialectic between religious texts and experts, on the one hand, and a network 
of vague categories, on the other. 'This dialectic both allows the vague comparative categories 
to be specified by more concrete categories and systematically subjects the entire scheme to 
correction by concrete details in an ongoing process of deepening comparison. 
lo' The most realistic and promising ofthese is Dennett's heterophenomenological method, 
which is really the formal statement of a process of comparison that is already employed in 
many contexts; see Dennett, "A Method for Phenomenology." 
RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCES 387 
influences, including the internal logic of the concepts and experiences with which 
they have to grapple, and the historical circumstances that condition key decisions 
taken. And most such processes of adoption develop against the background of 
neurally and socially conditioned ranges of possible options. Because of h s ,  many 
thmkers have been able sensibly to advance analyses of distinctive patterns of 
religious speech or other activity that lay the groundwork for the effective detection 
of the similar under the guise of the differently described.lo3 Such interdisciplinary 
work is relatively new and plagued by problems of arbitrariness of analysis, but there 
is every reason to expect it to improve rapidly as more scholars reach across 
disciplines for promising resources. 
Together, these observations indicate that the relativity of description of ultimacy 
experiences-phenomenologically, culturally, communally, theologically, and 
ehcally-while daunting, is not the impasse that it can seem upon, first encounter. 
5.4 Spiritrral Discernment 
Many religious groups embody considerable wisdom with regard to the authenticity 
of both discrete and extended ultimacy experiences. Discernment is not magic; it 
does not afford otherwise impossible access to the minds and experiences of an 
individual. And be that as it may, the effectiveness of discernment can be accounted 
for without the supposition of supernatural guidance. Traditionally, its operation 
involves a wise and experienced mentor or teacher, or the collective wisdom of a 
group, in dialogue with an individual who reports a profound or unusual religious 
experience. At minimum, it is a regulative process that refines the application of 
special words used in that group's social-linguistic context to describe such 
experiences. Sometimes discernment also involves the evaluation of information or 
instructions whose origins the individual might attribute to his or her experience. 
Typically it is a caring, pastoral process fiom whch the individual and discerners 
alike emerge wiser, more experienced, and better adjusted. 
The social implementation of these discernment processes varies widely, as does 
their regulative effectiveness. Examples include the teacher-student relationshp in 
some Hindu schools such as Vedanta and in most forms of Buddhism, the 
relationship between Christian believers and their confessors or spiritual advisors, 
the benevolent authority of groups of Jewish Rabbis over the groups they serve, and 
the relationship between the community and an individual in groups such as the 
Quakers. Discernment processes are evident almost everywhere religion is found. 
While they are typically absent in the (usually explosive) phase of a religion's 
infancy, they tend to be established quickly. As discussed above, there are arguably 
One example especially relevant to the analysis of ritual experiences is Eugene G. 
d'Aquili, Charles D. Laughlin, and J. McManus, The Specbum of Ritual: A Biogenetic 
Sbuctural Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979). An example pertaining 
to the connections between the architecture of religious buildings and religious experience, 
and relying mostly on arguments from hemispheric dominance, is James B. Ashbrook, The 
Human Mind and the Mind of God: Theological Promise in Brain Research (Lanham: 
University Press of America, 1984). More generally, see Carol Rausch Albright and James B. 
Ashbrook, The Humanizing Brain: Where Religion and Neuroscience Meet (Cleveland: 
Pilgrim Press, 1997); Laurence 0. McKinney, Neurotheology: Krtual Religion in the 21st 
Cerrbuy (Cambridge: American Institute for Mindfulness, 1994); and David Pomsh, "Finding 
God in the Three-Pound Universe: TheNeuroscience of Transcendence," Omni 16.1(1993). 
Little has been done specifically in relation to theological modes of speech, but see Wesley J. 
Wildman, Speaking of Ultimacy, forthcoming. 
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even secular forms of discernment, such as the patient-analyst relationship in 
psychoanalysis. The fact that these secular forms of discernment exist shows that 
discernment processes take their rise in the first instance not fiom religious interests 
but fiom ordinary processes of social-linguistic regulation by which groups try to 
make sure important descriptions are applied to experiences correctly. 
In what sense is discernment a regulative process? People wanting to describe 
their ultimacy experiences will tend to use the terminology that their social-linguistic 
context makes available to them, as they understand it. They can only really discover 
the aptness of their descriptions by imaginatively or actually trylng them out and 
seeing what happens. They may or may not revise their description; that will depend 
on their group's reactions and how much they care about those reactions. For 
example, a lazy, narcissistic person is unllkely to be believed when he or she claims 
to have received a revelation from a divine being in the absence of radical 
personality changes and a plausible angelic message. A skeptical reaction might 
force a change in the description offered or it might marginalize a person intransigent 
about his or her claim. In either case, the complex discernment relation serves to 
regulate current and future descriptions of purported ultimacy experiences. 
Discernment is a complex dialectical process and it is not always successful in 
creating agreement among all parties. But it is remarkably successll just the same 
and the natural question is: Why? Other examples of regulative social-linguistic 
processes exist, including those operative when a child is learning how to apply 
names to observable objects. These processes work because mistakes can be 
corrected. But how does the regulative dialectic operating in the description of 
ultimacy experiences work? Since experiences are not observable in the same way 
that physical objects are, how can mistakes be corrected? Might not the situation for 
ultimacy experiences be one of "hermeneutics all the way down"? That is, could 
completely different experiences receive identical descriptions and still pass muster 
in the discernment processes? At one level, we cannot answer these questions 
because the problem of other minds is not going to dissolve; not even the prospect 
of neurological correlates for mental events removes the problem in its abstract 
philosophical form. Yet, as we try to show in section 6, many factors are relevant to 
assessing putative ultimacy experiences, and together they make less plausible the 
logically possible option of utter relativism of descriptions of ultimacy experiences. 
Withm religious groups, the wisdom about typical and atypical ultimacy experiences 
built over centuries and activated in discernment processes is the key to producing 
such agreement as exists in judgments of authenticity. 
There are two observations to be drawn for our interpretation of ultimacy 
experiences fiom the perspective of spiritual discernment. First, spiritual discern- 
ment is a crucial factor in the linguistic environment of religious groups because 
such groups typically exercise considerable influence over their members' beliefs 
and the modes of expression of those beliefs. Thus, religious people tend to describe 
their experiences of ultimacy in terms likely to satisfy the discerning eye of their 
group. Because of this, second, they are also likely to value some types of discrete 
experiences more than others, some descriptions of experiences more than others, 
and some patterns of transformation more than others. Communities that value 
mystical states will have members who value them and describe ultimacy experi- 
ences in such terms. Groups that stress the virtue of long-term, stable character 
transformation will promote such temporally extended ultimacy experiences in their 
members as well as appropriate descriptions. 
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Of all methods for assessing ultirnacy experiences, religious discernment claims 
the most extensive experience and the richest traditions of interpretation, much more 
extensive than nonreligious branches of psychology or phenomenology. Thus, 
discemment is at present a crucial factor in evaluating the emerging canddates for 
neurological and phenomenological markers of ultimacy experiences. Openness to 
normative judgments in religious contexts also makes possible a move from 
judgments about typical ultimacy experiences to judgments concerning their 
authenticity--a characteristic important for the constructive venture of section 6. 
6 Rocedures for Identrting TypicnC and Authentic UElimacy Experiences 
6.1 A DescrQbion of Typical Uttimacy Experiences 
Our description of ultimacy experiences constitutes a detailed taxonomy (section 2 
on phenomenology) in conjunction with a neurological part-model (section 3) and 
a number of more explanatory considerations (social-psychological in section 4 and 
theological-ethical in section 5). This descriptive apparatus is usefhl for determining 
when a typical ultimacy experience has occurred. In traditional religious practice, 
workmg taxonomies conditioned primarily by informal phenomenological and 
theological perspectives have dominated the interpretation and evaluation of 
ultimacy experiences. Our taxonomy gives greater weight to the neurological and 
social-psychological perspectives than they have traditionally received. The 
taxonomy is recapitulated in Appendx A, which also serves as a reader's guide to 
the entire argument. 
We wish to stress the idea that there is a spectrum of both discrete and extended 
ultimacy experiences. Our taxonomy describes typical ultimacy experiences, and it 
is not the case that they just occur or not in binary fashion. At the center of an 
imaginary target there is an ideal type, recognizable by traditional theological 
criteria; richly describable in consistent ways by, say, a psychoanalyst or an 
evolutionary psychologist; with brain activity lcnown to be strongly correlated with 
what are usually accepted as ultimacy experiences; and with experiential phenomena 
embracing several of the categories dscussed earlier (for discrete states, sensory 
alteration, self-alteration, presences, cognitions, emotions). Other discrete 
experiences in the ultimacy spectrum would possess some of the features listed 
above, but in some categories might lack relevant features or even possess 
contradicting features. There would be controversy, then, as to whether to accept 
such experiences as being ultimacy experiences. In addition, there would be 
experiences lying at the edges, acknowledged simply as belongmg to the ultimacy 
spectrum, but as being only partial in character. 
Furthermore, characteristic features of ultimacy experiences permit the 
distinguishing of types. The two main types we have identified are the dscrete and 
extended ultimacy experiences. We further distinguished between social and 
transformation ultimacy experiences within the extended type and we hypothesize 
that clusters of features recur with such frequency that it makes sense to distinguish 
other subtypes. For example, within the discrete type, feelings of oceanic peace and 
wideness of compassion are frequent consequences of certain meditative techques. 
Meditation produces other experiences, but the peaceful, compassionate state seems 
to be so frequently encountered that it can usefully be designated a subtype. We have 
been careful not to elaborate subtypes both because the systematic survey data 
needed to identify them do not exist and because the descriptive apparatus needed 
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to create meaningful survey instruments is unstable, mostly due to the need for 
further development of stable cross-cultural descriptive categories and of the neuro- 
sciences. We can predict, however, that these subtypes would be related to one 
another in family resemblance fashlon and that each would have its own distinctive- 
ness, with typical instances closer to the center of its own circular target than 
marginal instances. Ths is precisely the situation that obtains in the diagnosis of 
neurological disorders, and the prominent role of brain processes gives us every 
reason to expect that ultimacy experiences, especially of the discrete kind, will be 
similar. 
Our description of typical ultimacy experiences has produced more than a multi- 
faceted taxonomy. Because we have paid close attention to the relation between 
social-linguistic environments and the way that individuals describe purported 
ultimacy experiences, we have a workmg model of the complicated hermeneutical 
transactions that occur between individuals and groups in the having and describing 
of ultimacy experiences. This model is useful both for understanding why ultimacy 
experiences are described the way they are and for evaluating putative ultimacy 
experiences. 
With regard to the way typical ultimacy experiences are detected, the application 
of our descriptive taxonomy can be likened to medical diagnostic procedures that 
also distinguish conditions based on typical sets of features. The cross-cultural 
aspect of this analogy is particularly apt. For example, an individual presents with 
the complaint, "It hurts when I take a breath." A Western-trained doctor might note 
that the person is also coughmg and breathing somewhat rapidly. Were he to have 
a conversation with a colleague, they would llkely agree that pneumonia must be 
ruled out. In a different diagnostic culture, the clinician and her colleagues might 
consider that there is an imbalance of qi. In the first setting, a set of objective data 
would be sought: the temperature, the number of white cells in the blood, a 
radiographic picture of the chest. In the second setting, other data such as detailed 
characteristics of the pulse and the appearance of the tongue would be gathered. 
Within the Western diagnostic fiamework, there is an ideal type-pneumonia- 
that has certain co-occurring subjective and objective features. In other cases with 
the same subjective complaint, the white cell count and x-ray will be silent, leaving 
the clinician with the cough, dyspnea, and pleuritic pain. He or she will consider 
pneumonia to have been ruled out and may diagnose a viral illness with pleuritis. In 
still another case, a person may have no complaint but be found to be increasingly 
weak and lethargic. A physical exam and blood cell count might raise the suspicion 
of pneumonia, subsequently confinned by x-ray. Various combinations of subjective 
and objective phenomena are interpreted both by the individual and by relevant 
experts. 
Modern Western mdcine is but one hermeneutical approach to diagnosing 
b d l y  ailments. It is not uncommon to find detailed and recognizable descriptions 
of certain illnesses in the literature of other cultures and eras. The observation that 
tubercular symptoms may remit at hgh altitudes, for example, was established long 
before the pathogenic bacillus was identified and its oxygen requirements 
understood. The association between a rich diet and gouty attacks was known before 
the pathways of uric acid metabolism had been elucidated. Many observations and 
varying vocabularies in the course of time can be made consistent w i t h  an enlarged 
fiamework. Nevertheless, gray areas and ambiguities wdl always remain, stimulating 
further investigative and hermeneutic efforts. 
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This extended analogy fiom medicine expresses the &agnostic procedure made 
possible by our description of ultimacy experiences. It also illustrates the flexibility 
of the descriptive taxonomy with respect to managing complex or partial instances 
of ultimacy experiences. It even suggests how sufficiently detailed descriptions of 
ultimacy experiences might be used to relate culturally distinctive patterns of 
description. But there is an important disanalogy here as well. Western medicine has 
a sophsticated causal theory of pneumonia that is more detailed, less arbitrary, and 
better able to be tested and improved than competitive causal theories such as those 
based on qi. This is so even though Western patterns of diagnosis and treatment are 
inferior to those of non-Western medicine in some instances. To this point we have 
offered no causal theory for any type or subtype of ultimacy experiences, but only an 
extended, multi-faceted description that makes possible a diagnostic procedure. We 
return to the question of a causal model for ultimacy experiences in section 7. 
6.2 Detedng Typical Uihacy Experiences 
We have described a procedure for idenwing typical ultimacy experiences using 
our descriptive taxonomy and using a working model of the complicated hermeneu- 
tics of the social-linguistic processes that condition the having and describing of 
ultimacy experiences. All this constitutes a rich framework for articulating why one 
does or does not accept an experience as belongmg to the category of ultimacy and 
whether or not a putative ultimacy experience would be deemed typical. The 
authenticity of such experiences is another matter, to which we turn in section 6.3. 
As a demonstration of how the procedure for detecting typical ultimacy experiences 
might be applied, let us evaluate some possible examples of ultimacy experiences. 
The Interictal Personality. We refer here to the chronic personality traits 
observed in some temporal lobe epilepsy patients (described above). From the 
phenomenological side, the salient feature is not &screte experiences (sensory 
alterations, self-alterations, presences, etc.) but an ongoing interest in religious and 
philosophcal matters together with a moralistic attitude, intensified emotions, and 
a "viscous" interpersonal style. Thus, the temporally extended phenomenological 
category is pertinent here. What is notable, as regards the elements of that category 
(existential potency, social embedding, transformation of behavior and personality, 
and transformation of beliefs), is a dissociation of beliefs (whch are pronounced in 
these individuals) fiom behavior and character changes of a moral and ethical nature; 
it is not reported that these individuals are more altruistic towards others or more 
selfless than prior to their illness. To summarize the phenomenological dimension 
of this type of individual, then, we find only one element of the several that we deem 
typical of extended experiences of ultimacy. 
Mov~ng to the neurological domain, we can surmise that this personality is based 
on accumulated episodes of aberrant temporal lobe activity. Perhaps our putative 
markers, involving medial temporal structures and the lateral temporal cortex, would 
be in&cated in brain images. Moving next to the social-psychological dimension, 
Merent experts (neurologists, psychoanalysts, and evolutionary psychologists) 
might fiame the phenomena differently. As we have seen, Bear and Ramachandran 
understand the phenomena as a form of limbic-sensory hyperconnection. Neurolo- 
gists generally do not find these patients particularly pleasant to deal with, as they 
tend to be overly concerned with detail and to prolong encounters, disregarding cues 
directed towards terminating a conversation (viscosity). A psychoanalyst would 
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regard such a patient as an obsessive character-again, with connotations of rigidity 
and insensitivity to others. Evidence of unconscious aggression might be discerned. 
In sum, what might appear to be a religious conversion taken solely on the face 
of the individual's expressed interests does not seem particularly convincing when 
viewed from these multiple perspectives. Hermeneutically speaking, we might relate 
it to an "ideal" conversion as we would relate pleuritis to pneumonia: they are not 
the same even though they share a few features. 
Disctvte Temporal Lobe Phenomena. Dostoevsky's The Idiot contains the 
following passage describing a complex partial seizure. 
His mind and his heart were flooded with extraordinary light; all his uneasiness, all his 
doubts, all his anxieties were relieved at once; they wen all merged in a lofty calm, full 
of serene, harmonious joy and hope. Since at that second, that is at the very last conscious 
moment before the fit, he had time to say to himself clearly and consciously, "Yes, for 
this moment one might give one's whole life!" then without doubt that moment was 
really worth the whole of life.'@' 
From a phenomenological point of view, some complex partial seizures indeed 
are remarkably similar to the discrete experiences generally accepted as religious. 
If they are reflected on and lead to changes such as those described under the 
temporally extended category (behavior, character, and belief change), then they 
would conform to an elaborated phenomenology traditionally associated with 
ultimacy experiences. From a social-psychological perspective, again, different 
experts might view these episodes in various ways. In a psychoanalytic setting, a 
person with the discrete experiences just quoted might be understood as regressing 
to an infantile state of bliss and security which in his real infancy had been 
traumatically tom away. In the context of a life-stage psychology, if a person were 
struggling with a terminal illness an experience such as the one above might be 
considered a defense against an impossible struggle and its attendant despair, or a 
letting-go of both. We can imagine still other hypothetical interpretations arising in 
other social-psychological settings: it is not obvious, though, that experts in all fields 
would have cogent explanations to offer. 
From a neurological perspective, such an individual might very well have the 
neurological markers of ultimacy experiences discussed above. In the future it might 
be possible to show that brain activity indistinguishable from the transient temporal 
lobe discharges seen in epilepsy is an invariable concomitant of discrete religious 
experience, equivalent to a positive x-ray in pneumonia. In the meantime, we would 
say that this case stands much closer to the ideal type of discrete ultimacy experi- 
ences than the case of the interictal personality does to the ideal type of extended 
ultimacy experiences. 
Sex and drugs. In some cultures, alteration of emotion and the experience of self 
are sought through sexual arousal or the use of drugs. Drugs can also be used to 
generate hallucinations that are held to be spiritually significant. In the instances we 
have in mind, the use of arousal or intoxication is highly ritualized and is contextual- 
ized by a group's articulated religious or metaphysical beliefs. To decide whether 
these are ultimacy experiences, we would apply our several criteria. We would want 
to know how closely the phenomena conform to the five elements of discrete 
ultimacy phenomena, and whether they bring about chronic changes conforming to 
the four elements of extended ultimacy experiences. We would ask whether these 
Fyodor Dostoevsky, The Idiot (New York: Bantam Books, 198 1 ; first published 1869), 
218-19. 
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manipulations produce the neural hallmarks of ultimacy experiences. Probably the 
group in which these practices occur would make the richest social-psychological 
interpretations and relevant observations, but other observations and interpretations 
would also be possible. 
Remorse and Transformation. Although psychoanalytrc treatment focuses on 
unconscious conflict rather than on undesirable behavior, in a successful treatment 
patients alter their previous behavior, sometimes radically. For example, a man who 
could not keep a job because of h s  arrogance and who had alienated two wives by 
h s  narcissistic demands had been in treatment for several years when he began to 
contrast some new, unselfish behavior with his past patterns. As he became fully 
able to see hunself as he had been, he spent many sessions in a state of deep remorse, 
bemoaning the damage he had done in his relationships, even weeping. He made 
attempts at rapprochement with his estranged adult chldren and was deeply moved 
by their forgiveness. He became able to tolerate the demands of a job. even though 
his position was much less prestigious than in the past. As he described his new 
capacity for acts of kindness towards others and patience with himself, he realized 
he felt very much at peace and actually happy. 
Let us subject h s  account to our fourfold criteria. Phenomenologically, it does 
not contain any discrete states relevant to ultimacy. The account is strongly marked 
by a change in behavior and character, unaccompanied, however, by a belief system 
involving concepts of ultimacy. From a social-psychological viewpoint, psychoana- 
lysts of various schools might give rich accounts-for example, that he had 
developed the capacity to serve as a self-object for others once he no longer required 
them to be narcissistic self-objects for hun. An evolutionary psychologist might note 
the negative consequences of his previous selfish behavior, arguing that they had 
caused a shift in strategy to altruism. From a neurological perspective, we would 
expect neural signatures to be absent. From a theologicaYethical point of view, it 
might be noted that the person had passed into the second of the three Kierke- 
gaardian stages of transformation. We might conclude that this vignette bears some 
of the signs of ultimacy, but lies at too far a distance from the ideal type to be 
counted as an ultimacy experience in the usual sense of the phrase. 
We might think, however, that this person had potential for moving closer to a 
recognizable experience of ultimacy, a Kierkegaardian third stage, in contrast to the 
interictal personality, for example. This is, in effect, a prediction. Medical hagnosis 
is useful to the extent that it p rdc t s  the future course of events. In the absence of 
interventions, a diagnosis of pneumonia prehcts a different course than a diagnosis 
of viral-associated pleuritis. As our understanding of ultimacy experiences increases, 
it should allow predictions as to course and outcome to be made and tested. 
6.3 Detecting Authentic (mtimacy Experiences 
Detecting typical ultimacy experiences does not require normative categories such 
as authenticity. There is no concern with the reality of the purported ultimate object 
of such experiences in h s  detection, and no judgment is made about what is better 
or worse in any religious sense. Within various narrower social-linguistic frame- 
works, limited normative judgments are made, as when a sociobiologist points out 
the serendipitous outworkings of an adaptive behavior or a psychoanalyst notes that 
unhappiness is caused by denial of trauma because denial engenders obsessive 
repetition of psychic processes in situations akin to that in which the trauma first 
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occurred. But there is no comprehensive judgment made about the authenticity of 
ultimacy experiences in our diagnostic assessments of putative instances of them. 
The conventional wisdom seems to be that there is no meaninglid way to discuss 
richer normative judgments of authenticity in scienhfic contexts; such matters should 
be left to the discernment procedures of religious groups. We demur. Judgments of 
authenticity are not much different than judgments of what is typical. The added 
element is merely the willingness of a social-linguistic context to stipulate what 
ought to occur. Psychologists may try to refiain f?om normative "ought" language, 
confining themselves to the "if-then" logic defined by the patient's own convic- 
tions-"ifsuch-and-such is an important goal to you, then so-and-so is the way to 
achieve it1'--as though therapy were essentially a means-ends technology. In 
practice, however, psychologists often care about their patients and identlfy with 
their goals of happiness or peace of mind, making a community of at least two 
people with shared goals and a clear sense of what ought to happen. Sociobiologists 
can probably afford to be stricter about avoiding normative language, but impartial- 
ity is only a limited virtue. Sympathetic, explicitly partial identification with others 
is the very stuff of hendship, community life, and caring behavior, and thus has its 
own virtues. 
Where psychologists tend to walk the line between scientific objectivity and 
passionate concern-losing balance while walking this line is an occupational 
hazard, in fact-other social contexts promote full-blooded commitment to the value 
of ultimacy experiences. In such contexts, along with an amassing of experience 
about what is typical, there is a concern to recognize and cultivate authentic ultimacy 
experiences. This passionate embrace of comprehensive normative categories can 
be described in the same way that any complex relation between a group and its 
members is described. Such descriptions can be impartial even if the judgments of 
authenticity being described are thoroughly, adventurously biased by a passionate 
sense of what ought to happen. 
In practice, many religious groups manifest a double concern with the 
authenticity of ultimacy experiences. On the one hand, they promote authentic 
ultimacy experiences by lavishing honor and encouragement upon those who have 
them, especially in virtue of the deeper forms of wisdom and maturity achieved by 
means of such ultimacy experiences. Such cultivation is one of the expected 
commitments of a religious group. On the other hand, the di-ent procedures 
of many religious groups are designed to parse inauthentic from authentic ultimacy 
experiences, as described above in section 5.4. Besides applying accumulated 
experience to judgmg whether a purported ultimacy experience is typical, such 
discernment also relies heavily on a background of assumptions about what is in fact 
occurring in a typical ultimacy experience. For example, whereas folk religions 
encourage trance states and revere those who achieve them, the greatest respect is 
reserved for those shamans who subsequently exhibit behavior confirming the 
group's background belief that a trance state involves a spiritual journey in which 
the traveler receives wisdom capable of solving real problems in the community. 
The interpretation of ultimacy experiences underlying such criteria for 
authenticity is effectively a causal model. It follows that judgments of authenticity 
can be described impartially. However, they cannot be confirmed fiom beyond the 
social-linguistic community within which those judgments are made without 
evaluation of the underlying causal interpretation of ultimacy experiences. Any 
evaluation of a group's causal model is complicated by the fact that it will be 
expressed in the distinctive language of that social-linguistic context. That makes 
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comparing and testing such causal models so tricky that the scientific literature in 
religious experiences tends to stay in the domain of the typical and to avoid 
altogether the fuzzier temtory of the authentic. Nevertheless, in section 7 we shall 
propose our own causal model that we hope is helpful for analyzing and comparing 
other causal models and for evaluating judgments of authenticity with some degree 
of impartiality. That causal model also offers us the opportunity to venture some 
ideas about the ultimate causes and value of ultimacy experiences, albeit within the 
constraints of our metaphysically relatively neutral approach. 
6.4 An Orientation to the Future 
It is worthwhile noting that considerations from neurophysiology can have little 
dimct relevance for causal theories of ultirnacy experiences (and so for theories of 
divine action) at the present time. There is of course the obvious obligation to 
express such theories in ways that are responsive to the general relevance of the 
neurosciences for understanding human beings. But the situation seems to be one of 
sipficant independence of the two realms of discourse as far as direct relations are 
concerned, with indirect relations possible because of mutual connections to general 
theories of human nature. Our approach to diagnosis of typical ultimacy experiences 
is likely to become more effective with the passage of time, however, for three 
reasons. 
First, phenomenological accounts of religious experience will become more 
refined as advances are made in comparing descriptions of experiences from diverse 
cultures. Thls sort of comparison is in its infancy, yet it is the most promising line of 
solution to the problems associated with deciding when phenomenologically similar 
episodes are being described in different ways and when similarity of descriptions 
is misleading. 
Second. research in neuroscience does not yet furnish us with any correlations 
between neural activity and phenomenology definite enough to identlfy a specific 
neural signature of discrete ultimacy events of any sort. We 'have said that such 
neural signatures would probably include activity pervading the medial temporal 
regions and extendmg into the anterior temporal cortices, perhaps especially in the 
dominant hemisphere. These tentative suggestions are based on data from temporal 
lobe epilepsy and our speculations regarding semantic processing and social 
participation. But they are pointers towards a hopelid future, not fm criteria in the 
present. 
Thud, our use of social-psychological categories drawn from nontheological 
frames of reference is meant to open up the possibility that experiences recognizably 
related to ultimacy can occur without being so labeled. Although descriptive and 
explanatory frameworks differ between religious and nonreligious contexts, it is 
probable that some of the same phenomena are being described. Moreover-and 
linlung the first two points-neural markers of ultirnacy experiences could support 
this conjecture and thereby furnish an intriguing basis for the comparison of 
experiences across cultures and social-linguistic systems. Such markers could also 
supply a partial test of the ability of phenomenological descriptions of ultimacy 
experiences to register these similarities. 
It follows that an orientation to the future is crucial both for the development of 
better correlations between neurology and other types of descriptions of ultimacy 
experiences, and for correcting the theoretical underpinnings of the model as they 
take shape at any given time. 
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7 The Causes and Value of Uhimacy Experiences 
7.1 The Problem with Modeling Causes 
We have passed fiorn describing ultimaky experiences (sections 2-5) to the problem 
of detecting them (section 6) and now we turn our attention to the intriguing issues 
surrounding their causes and value. For now we concentrate on causes; we turn to 
value in section 7.5, below. 
Models of the causes of ultimacy experiences underlie the judgments made in 
religious groups about the authenticity of putative ultimacy experiences, as we saw 
in section 6.3, above. Unfortunately, we can make little use of such folk models 
because, though they take account of a rich mass of testimonial data, they are too 
narrow in scope, limited by. the usually unexamined convictions of the group, 
uninformed by outside experts, and oblivious to neurological considerations. By 
contrast, our investigation of the causes of ultimacy experiences has to take account 
of all the interpretative perspectives offered in the descriptive phase of this essay, 
except of course that phenomenology is of little use, being specrfically neutral to 
questions of causation. 
The idea of investigating the causes of a class of phenomena is problematic. For 
the sake of argument, let us suppose that we can leap over the high hurdle of internal 
variation within the class of phenomena; then we could treat the class of phenomena 
as defining a single question about causes rather than a horde of distinct questions. 
Our task then would seem to involve finding the best causal model for the 
phenomena. To do that we would have to construct the best model we can, malung 
sure that it is capable of being compared with competitors and that it surpasses them 
in descriptive richness and explanatory effectiveness. That is a complicated but 
thinkable task and tasks llke it are carried out all the time in the natural and social 
sciences. 
What does a causal model look like? Put simply, causal models describe how 
causes and effects are arranged in chains or networks of events by giving a 
theoretical and sometimes mathematized account both of the linkages between 
events and of what events ought to be observed. In order to give a causal model of 
cosmic ray detection, for example, a series of events, some observable and some 
hypothetical, is described. Successive particle decays are postulated to occur with 
probabilities consistent with going theoretical models fiorn high-energy physics and 
then constraints on observable effects are deduced that make the model vulnerable 
to correction through experiments. The same is true for deterministic causal models 
of colliding billiard balls, planetary motion, or the cleaning mechanism of a machme 
that washes clothes. 
Such a model is certamly possible for ultimacy experiences, though there would 
be no mathematizing of linkages or observable events involved. Consider two such 
models. Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that Ultimacy is thought of as an 
intentional being with causal powers. We could include such a causal factor in one 
model, making of it a complex hypothesis in favor of intentional divine action as a 
causal factor in ultimacy experiences. Alternatively, we could exclude that factor and 
develop a model advancing the hypothesis that the causes of ultimacy experiences 
can be accounted for without reference to an intentional divine causal agent. Then 
we set the two hypothetical models to the task of accounting for data and watch to 
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see what happens. The better of the two wins the day and must take on yet other 
hypothetical models of the causes of ultimacy experiences. 
f i s  is a simplified version of what happens in the natural and social sciences but 
it is enough to show that finding the best causal model of ultimacy experiences is an 
intelligible goal providmg that the competing models produce sufficiently different 
predictions to enable the data to discriminate between them. Unfortunately, centuries 
ofwrangling over the issue of divine action have proved h t l e s s ,  essentially because 
the infamous slipperiness of language about God and divine action seems to make 
falsfiable prdctions unachievable. This situation is not a matter of intellectual 
dishonesty on the part of those throwing their weight behind the model that affirms 
an intentional divine agent, though some are quick to leap to that conclusion and 
subsequently dismiss theology as a serious form of intellectual work. It is rather a 
consequence of the intrinsic difficulty of the problem itself. The actions of an 
intentional divine being-as with any causal agent-are only predictable to the 
extent that quite a lot is known about the nature of this divine being. But the sacred 
texts of most trarlltions, when they portray an intentional divine being, typically insist 
that the divine intention is inscrutable, often in flagrant contradiction to human 
expectations, and impossible to predict. Moreover, the events in which divine action 
is said to occur are dense with meanings and subject to all kinds of more or less 
persuasive interpretations. All thls makes it virtually impossible for the data of 
ultimacy experiences to dnve a wedge between our two models, pushing one into the 
superior position. 
It is tempting to yield to the positivist instinct and jettison the divine-action 
model on the grounds that it is too arbitrary, too suspiciously convenient, too hard 
to test and so too difficult to render meaningful, and weighed down by an extra 
hypothesis (intentional divine action) that seems superfluous in explaining all of the 
scienbfically admssible data about ultimacy experiences. Theologians certamly have 
displayed plenty of self-conscious embarrassment about this problem during the last 
two-hundred years. Like not being invited to a party where everyone who is anyone 
is having fun, theologians defending divine action are out of fashion in modern and 
postmodem intellectual circles. Yet fairness demands that the difficulties in showing 
the sufficiency of the alternative, more minimalist view for explaining ultimacy 
experiences be squarely admitted. The minimalist model is a more progressive 
research program and so more persuasive, in one way, yet the nature of the subject 
matter demands that we hesitate to apply the usual criteria for decidmg theoretical 
debates. So the debate wanders along, reeling and rolling fiom criteria for theory 
choice to the peculiarities of models involving God and back again, never getting 
very far, and driving everyone crazy. A few people resolve the unbearable tension 
by taking the positivist escape route but that seems to have all the leap-of-faith 
character of the decision to affirm the action of an intentional divine being. The 
debate seems futile. 
In light of this analysis, there is an obvious problem with trying to develop a 
causal model for ultimacy experiences. Deciding between competitive models has 
to be possible in order to make building causal models of ultimacy experiences a 
worthwhile activity, yet these decisions seem infuriatingly difticult to make. The best 
that can be done, it would seem, is to invent causal models as artists express 
themselves on canvas, and then leave all of the causal models hanging up for view 
in the philosophical analogy of an art gallery. Even if ruling out the weakest models 
is possible, deciding on the best model is an arbitrary and highly personal exercise 
that can never win rational consensus. Well, that may indeed be the best outcome but 
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we think there might be a more promising way. It is not that the impasse facing 
causal models of ultimacy experiences can somehow be evaded after all this time. 
No, the history of the question weighs too heavily for that. The point is rather that 
there is an alternative to modeling causes in the usual way. 
We propose to model ultimacy experiences by tracing sign-transformations 
rather than causes and effects. While thls approach is less familiar and requires some 
explanation, we claim for it three simcant virtues. First, it is more impartial than 
traditional causal models, a virtue deriving from the fact that it does not require the 
specdication of ontological causes and effects. Indeed, the ontological status of 
causes can be treated as a question to be answered in h s  approach, makmg it ideal 
for modeling ultimacy experiences. Second, the model employs a strategy of vague- 
ness with regard to irresolvable ontological questions in a constructive way that 
facilitates a nontraditional resolution to debates over the causes of ultimacy experi- 
ences. Third, the model is as useful for discussing the value as it is the causes of 
ultimacy experiences, enabling us to deal with both issues at once. We do not claim 
that this approach to modeling ultimacy experiences gets us further than the debate 
over causal models has gone but only that a change of theoretical sceneq can't hurt 
and that the vaguer, more impartial way we propose for framing questions about 
causes sidesteps many of these futile debates and stays closer to intelligible data. 
The approach of using sign transformations to model various complex process 
has enjoyed limited success within semiotic theory for many years and it is 
particularly apt for modeling phenomena related to neural processes. Moreover, sign 
transformations are the ideal way to express and manage the double fact that 
ultimacy experiences arise from brain activity that has been reflexively subjected to 
an interpretive process in a social-linguistic environment, and that this semiotic 
conditioning in turn depends on brain function. 
Any model makes simpllfylng and organizing assumptions. Independent 
arguments can be offered for such assumptions but they are most convincing when 
a model using them proves to be effective. Most of the assumptions of our model are 
gathered into what we are calling its philosophical-semiotic framework, a 
specifically philosophical elaboration of semiotic theory. The task of section 7.2 is 
to lay out this framework and to explain how it allows our model to be both neutral 
to, and yet well suited for investigating, the causes and value of ultimacy experi- 
ences. In section 7.3 we elaborate the model specifically in relation to the relevant 
considerations from the descriptive phase of our essay. Throughout these two 
sections, we make extensive use of footnotes to elaborate on technical points so as 
to keep the main text as lucid as possible for the general reader. The model is 
applied to a discussion of the causes of ultimacy experiences in section 7.4, including 
whether they demand explanation in terms of divine action, and to an analysis of 
theological claims for their truth, value, and importance in section 7.5. We conclude 
in section 7.6 with some speculative yet plausible and metaphysically modest 
suggestions about the nature of the ultimate causes of ultimacy experiences. 
7.2 The Model's PhilosophicalSemwtis Framework 
In the most general terms, semiotics is the theory of signs. As a technical discipline, 
it has applications in intellectual ventures as diverse as communication theory, 
developmental psychology, and anthropology. We adopt a philosophical view of 
semiotics that is indebted to the early North American pragmatists, especially 
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Charles Peirce.lo5 Signs are treated abstractly as anythmg that can be taken to stand 
for something else.lo6 The way signs standfor other signs in certain respects is 
analyzed in semiotic theory.'07 When one sign is taken to stand for another, we speak 
loosely of sign transformation of the object sign into the interpretant sign, intendmg 
to suggest that signs flow from one to the next, each standmg for the previous one 
in some respect. The entire flux of signs in all its complexity registers whatever 
underlying causal processes there might be, though other relations are registered in 
the semiotic flux as well.lo8 Yet it does so without assuming anythmg about the 
ontology of those causes (if indeed there are causes, on some South Asian meta- 
physical theories there is no underlying causation). When we speak of causation, we 
usually have in mind causal chains that are particularly si@cant for our interests; 
in fact, causation is much more like a surging river than a single thread of string. In 
the same way, the semiotic flux is enormously complex, and we pay attention to 
pieces of it selectively as circumstances and interests demand.lo9 By focusing on 
IoJ For convenient access to Peirce's view of pragmatism (he called it pragmaticism to 
distinguish it from the pragmatism of William James; Robert Neville has called it 
palwpragmatism to distinguish it from the nwpragmatism of Richard Row), see Part I1 of 
Philip P. Wiener, ed., Charless. Peirce: Selected Writings (New York: Dover, 1958). For his 
view of semiotics and logic, see the compilation in "Logic and Semiotic: The Thwry of 
Signs," 98-1 19; and other essays in Philosophical Writings of Peirce, Justus Buchler, ed. 
(New York: Dover, 1955; originally published in 1940). The official edition ofPeirce's works 
is Charles Hartshome and Paul Weiss, eds., CollectedPapers of Charles Saunders Peirce, 
6 vols. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 193 1-35). 
lo' Semioticians have elaborated subtle distinctions among many types of signs. The most 
basic is the three-fold distinction between icon, index, and symbol, but sophisticated 
taxonomies have been produced in semiotic theory by paying close attention to the 
astonishingly diverse ways in which things stand for other things. 
lo' This is a simple formulation of the basic semiotic structure. More precisely, the basic 
semiotic structure is four-fold in its logical form: (1) an object-sign (2) interpreted by (3) an 
interpretant-sign, with the interpretation occurring (4) in? particular respect. This structure 
is highly abstract, applicable quite generally to complex ahd simple processes, in every kind 
of system, including the neural, physiological, and cognitive. Structures of this kind are 
important elements of thwries, illuminating common structural features of disparate objects 
and processes. Without it, a theory of religious experiences is likely to be arbitrary and 
unprincipled. With it, complex communication against the background of sophisticated 
cognitive habits can be analyzed as readily as physiological processes or neural signaling, all 
using the same semiotic framework. That is what our model requires. 
la' Peirce's semiotic theory is compatible with a causal thwry of reference in which 
reference is understood to be achieved causally rather than merely "thought" in some way 
independently of the physical, causal world. Accordingly, sign relations of reference that are 
registered in the semiotic flux actually reflect causal processes. Other relations between signs, 
such as merely associative relations, can also be thought of as actually causal, given the 
wmplex social and neural connections that underlie the imaginative connections we make. 
It follows that the semiotic flux is more closely reflective of underlying causal processes than 
might seem to be the case at first. 
'"Alfred North Whitehead in Pmcess andRealiQ: An Essay in Cosmology (New York: 
The Macmillan Co., 1929) articulates a thwry of causation that is explicit about the enormous, 
multi-directional complexity of causal relations. A few thinkers influenced by Whitehead have 
found in semiotic theory a convenient way to express a similarly rich thwry of the semiotic 
traces of causation, though without what they take to be the metaphysically overdetermined 
and so unduly speculative character of Whitehead's theory. See, for example, Robert 
Cummings Neville, CreativiQ and God: A Challenge to Process Theology (New York: 
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sensory patterns produced become signs to be interpreted within their brains. If you 
stick your tongue out "at" someone, you are not just performing a motor act. In the 
terminology of George Herbert Mead, you are involung-for yourself and others-a 
public s y s k  of s i b s  in which there is consensus as to the effects that gesture 
should produce.l15 The same invocation of a public system of signs occurs when I 
utter a sentence. Networks of interrelated signs may be demarcated into separate 
territories that define communities, which vary in their interpretations ofhuman acts. 
The observation of a public gesture in t k  transforms the neural activity of the 
observer, creating a two-way intercourse of signs. Furthermore, all individuals who 
are not so estranged that they are incapable of discourse, or unconscious, are 
automatically and continually engaged in social semiosis. As we type, we are 
engaged in the social practice of "writing"; we might be wearing clothes that signal 
our status as at home or in the ofice; and so on. Certain neural events arise as 
interpretants of the keys beneath our fingers and the words before our eyes. These 
in turn act as signs to produce interpretants in the form of further patterns of neural 
activity, conditioned by patterns previously stored. In sum, the link between neural 
events and social-psychological events is a flow of semiosis, with successive 
transformations that lead from neural events. conditioned bv the semiotic environ- 
ment of the brain, to social events, conditioned by the semiotic environment of a 
particular society.l16 Neural events and social life can be thought of as dimensions 
of reality that show up together w i t h  a single, continuous flux of signs. 
At thls point, metaphysical choices multiply. There do seem to be levels of reality 
ranging from the universal and simple to the special and complex. We all believe this 
because our attempts to study reality as we engage it give rise to scholarly disciplines 
that in some respects relate to each other in herarchcal ways. But how should this 
hierarchy of levels be understood metaphysically? We may turn to an emergentist 
physicalism, to Whiteheadian naturalism, or to dimensionality metaphors for 
articulating what we mean. Semiotics can play a complementary role to these 
metaphysical constructions, one that is relatively independent of them. Spechcally, 
more complex levels of reality are registered in (or just are; we are not deciding that 
question here) a denser flux of signs. Density in this sense can be quanhfied in 
principle by counting the ways that signs hc t ion  as interpretants for and within that 
which is complex; the density of the semiotic system is the way we know that we are 
engaging more complex levels of reality. In thls way, we continue to evade settling 
metaphysical inventory questions while preserving a natural way to speak of the 
relationships between types or domains or dimensions or levels of reality. Ths 
allows us to extend the discussion above of the semiotic linkage between the neural 
and the social to two higher-level components of our model: the social-psychological 
and the religious-ethical. 
'I' George Herbert Mead, Mind, Sel/ and Society fiom h e  Standpoint of a Social 
Behaviorist (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1934). 
We find Teske's view one-sided when he states, "Our spirituality resides, not in the 
finitude of our individual biology, but in a historically and culturally emergent symbolic 
world," because our neurologically based capacities make the emergent symbolic world 
possible. See J. Teske, "The Spiritual Limits ofNeuropsychologicaI Li,"Zygon 3 1.2 (1996): 
209-34. Likewise, we find unconvincing those accounts of language and mental life that 
focus solely on neurology and neglect the necessity of social environment for the 
establishment and function of semiotic systems. Just as individuals operate within a semiotic 
milieu, and just as signs are more generally conditioned by the network of signs in which they 
emerge, so neural events are shaped and constrained by the brain's semantic networks. 
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First, the social-psychological considerations reflect the ways that the semiotic 
flux of which we have been speaking relates individual subjectivity to social- 
linguistic environments. Everyday consciousness is permeated with the sense of a 
standpoint, the subject. The subject may be present explicitly, as in self-conscious- 
ness, or implicitly, as in intentional thought and even some kinds of habitual actions; 
but we mean to exclude the sorts of habitual and mystical awareness in whch no 
sense of subjectivity is present. A complete account ofthe subject cannot be derived 
without both signs originating in neural events and signs interpreted w i b  a special 
sign-system arising fiom the social milieu. We take it that the latter sign-system, 
whch includes what we may designate as the "person system," exists because of its 
compatibility with brain function and its usefulness for organizing societies of 
individuals. Thus, the experiencing self' is neither solely brain-derived, nor solely 
socially derived. 
To account for the experiencing subject, then, we must consider semiotic 
processes arising both in the brain and in the social milieu, thereby making 
connections between the indwidual subjectivity and both the neural and the social- 
psychological. Body-related neural activity includes the firing patterns that encode 
movement and the patterns that register sensory events arising w i b  the body and 
at its peripheral receptors. The boundedness of b d e s  by their skins, and the fact of 
their &&rate spatialpositions, are signs derived fiom inkactions with the physical 
world and other b d e s .  Neural processes transform bodlly activity in the context of 
a group into a sign-a unique b d l y  identity-without implying subjective identity. 
I Bodies do not impinge on one another only through their spatial requirements, 
however. In certain highly social species, they deploy motor acts, even secretions, 
that function as signs. Such signs produce interpretants in the form of responsive 
behavior in other individuals. In primate species, social signs are registered and 
interpreted through a stream of neural semiosis that is well developed, particularly 
in apes and human beings. In humans, a rich neural semiotic capacity related to the 
gestures of others may have set the stage for a step into a still more intense kind of 
semiosis, the person-system. The key in every case is the semiotic richness of the 
system, whch depends in turn on the physiological achevement of critical levels of 
semiotic density and complexity. For example, the capacity of primate brains for 
social signaling appears to have accelerated; in a&tion, human brains are immense 
compared to those of our closest primate relatives. The sheer amount of wiring 
permits unirnagmably large numbers of semiotic transformations, social and non- 
social alike. The evolution of very complex societies, in turn, provides a remarkably 
dense system of signs within whch indvidual brains operate. Within such dense and 
sensitive systems, signs relating to one's own and other bodies could be interpreted 
in new ways."7 
"'We step back to note that the subiect is a swcial re~resentation within awareness that 
appears to be the location of awareness;tself.  his, it is Geeminently a spatial concept. In an 
essay on Kant, Strawson demonstrated that the intuition that we each possess a singularity of 
subjective experience-the certainty that my experience is mine and not someone else's- 
derives from an antecedent notion, that of the singularity of embodied persons. See P.F. 
Strawson, The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kanf's Critique of Pure Reason (London: 
Methuen and Company, 1966): 162-74. There are empirical criteria for that notion, namely, 
the existence of individual bodies that have unique identities. Attributing subjecthood to 
ourselves, then, is an interpretant of individual bodily identity. We saw above that individual 
bodily identity was itself an interpretant of neural patterns that encode bodily experience. 
Strawson termed it the illusion of a purely inner and yet subject-refemng use for "I." 
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Second, the religious-ethical can be understood semiotically as an extension of 
what has just been said about the social environment in relation to the indvidual 
subject. The flux of signs becomes denser and more complex under the impact of 
increasing complexlfication of both brains and social milieus, but it is not just a 
quantitative increase in engagement of the world that results. There are also 
qualitative increases, as demonstrated in the dfierence between the subjectivity of 
higher primates and its apparent absence in plants and simpler animals. It is 
reasonable to suppose that complex semiotic systems and complex brains permitted 
forms of engagement with dunensions of reality, including questions of value and 
purpose, that formerly were not possible. The expression of religious and ethical 
concerns is, like subjectivity, a form of the intensification of engagement with reality. 
In fact, we suggest that the semiosis of subjectivity, with its accompanying density 
and complexity, itself constitutes a necessary basis for the intensification of semiosis 
that we experience in morality and religion. 
We argued that the social system of concepts and rules related to persons is 
external to the brain on the one hand but compatible with it and dependent on it on 
the other. We said that a nascent phenomenology of separate bodily indwiduals 
interacts with neural and social semiosis to produce the subject. Similarly, one might 
think of the ultimacy dimension as external to human subjectivity, but compatible 
with it and dependent on it. We know that neural ensembles can be set into motion 
by language. Can human experience be engaged, in an analogous manner, by 
experiences of ultimacy? If so, we would expect the dimension of ultimacy to deepen 
every aspect of the semiotic flux we have described. In fact, the description of 
ultimacy as the depth dimension of reality seems singularly apt here.llB 
Deep engagement with reality in the forms of morality and religion is both 
incontestably important in the hlstory of human life and, necessarily on our critically 
realist point of view, indicative of reality. An explanation that does justice to the 
richness and potency of the moral and religious dimensions of life-including 
ultimacy experiences-is therefore required. This is so regardless of how the causes 
of religious and ethical engagement are finally assigned; the traces of those causes 
in the form of semiotic transformations themselves demand an adequate explanation. 
Even a world in which all religious beliefs and all attributions of &vine action are 
fundamentally mistaken remains astonishing, intriguing, and temfylng enough to 
demand at least the semiotic richness, the poetry and puzzled awe, though perhaps 
not the dogmatism or exclusivism, of the world's spiritually-oriented traditions. It 
may even be that literally mistaken yet symbolically referential rituals and dogmas 
and the forms of life they sponsor can advance profound engagement in the wild 
semiotic flux of the religious and moral dimensions of life. We do not thereby insist 
that religious beliefs are mistaken but we are led to ponder their usefulness even if 
Strawson also pointed out that the concept of person derives from our linguistic community. 
See "Persons" in Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics(London: Methuen and 
Co., 1959): 87-1 16. He said that a person is the union of mental life and body and pointed out 
that the concept necessarily has both first-person and third-person ascriptive uses. While the 
deployment of the basic person concept appears universal, local cultures have unique ways of 
characterizing persons that are narrated and enacted dramaturgically by individuals. Thus, at 
both the level of the subjectivity concept, and the level of the socially constituted person, there 
is intimate mutual interplay between phenomenological and social psychological signs. Each 
is mediated through complex neural semiotic activity. 
"' This is the terminology of Paul Tillich; see Systematic Theology, vol. 1 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago, 1951). 
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mistaken by reflection on the sign-flux within which human beings live and move 
and have their being. This is the practical implication of what it means to say that 
religion and morality are intense forms of engagement with the world even while 
remaining neutral as to the reality and efficacy of putative religious objects to which 
the cause of such realms of life is sometimes attributed. Semiotic complexity is 
required for such engagement regardless of the causal story offered for established 
religious and moral experiences and beliefs. 
Individual subjectivity, social groups, and brain processes are connected to one 
another through semiosis. They may be thought of as the vertices of a triangle whose 
sides denote bi-directional semiotic transformations. All the transformations taken 
together constitute the experiencing subject-in-a-social-context. In one respect, 
therefore, our view stands in contrast to the concept of a hierarchical model in which 
phenomena at each level are made to give rise to phenomena at the next, "higher" 
level. Hierarchical models may be epistemically and metaphysically helpfil in some 
ways but the semiotic perspective represents matters differently and, we W, 
helpfully: the neural, social, and individual territories are mutually bound and 
mutually determining through semiotic interfaces. And deepening it all are the 
extraordinarily rich semiotic transactions that we call ethlcal and religious, of which 
experiences of ultimacy are the most direct, personal manifestations. The structured 
character of the semiotic flux to which our model draws attention is pictured in 
Diagram 2 (see Appendix B). 
In saying that ultimacy experiences are peculiarly rich and deep forms of 
engagement with the world, we are making a couple of other suggestions. First, 
because ultimacy experiences are defined in the semiotic model as rich and deep 
forms of engagement and defined in mostly phenomenological fashion in the 
descriptive section of the essay, we are hypothesizing that these two definitions 
coincide. That is, wherever exceptionally deep and rich engagement is found, there 
will also be found ultimacy experiences in the ways we described them, and vice 
versa. Now, such experiences may not be especially religious in character; that is the 
purpose of the misalignment between the box denoting ultimacy experiences and the 
circle denoting conventional religious experiences in Diagram 1 (see Appendix B). 
But they are ultimacy experiences all the same. We W that the experiential source 
of religion is in part the deepest and richest elements of our engagement of the 
world; but only some of those are suitable for inclusion in domain of officially 
recognized religious experiences because of the other social interests of religions. 
That said, it is interesting to note that virtually every kind of rich and intense form 
of experience that occurs to human beings is recognized as religious in some cultural 
context. Second, we are positing a distinction between richness of engagement and 
focus of cultural and individual attention. Whlle that to which we attend may involve 
our rich engagement in the world, it is often the case that there is a lot of talk about 
some unimportant and relatively superficial phenomena and a lot of silence about 
and even inattention to exceptionally important phenomena. Thus, the amazingly 
large number of genocides in the last two hundred years is rarely spoken of and 
actually unknown by most people whereas in some communities the state of grass 
lawns is an intense topic of conversation. We think that there is a phenomenological 
difference between focused attention and intense engagement--one that is actually 
fairly easy for a person to detect given enough time.l19 
'I9 We are grateful for communications with Patrick Mcnamara about this essay and 
especially for his request for clarification of this point. 
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Ths philosophical-semiotic framework allows our model to be neutral but what, 
we must ask, is the specdic content of this model? After all, semiotic transforma- 
tions, even when good stories are told about them (as we tried to do above), remain 
fairly vague; for example, you cannot actually individuate or count them. Apart from 
the possibility of using the model to frame debates about causes in neutral fashion, 
therefore, it might seem that nothing has been gained by way of specific content. But 
something has been gained, though it is a modest gain. The positive content of the 
model has two aspects. First, the relations between individual subjectivity, social 
groups, and brain processes have been spelled out in some detail in the descriptive 
taxonomy. Sign transformation is the cement that holds these considerations together 
and represents them as mutually codetermining factors in conditioning ultimacy 
experiences. In this way the model brings that descriptive material to bear when it 
is used to evaluate theories attempting to penetrate beyond the semiotic flux of 
ultimacy experiences to the underlymg causes. Second, the model stresses depth and 
richness of engagement as the hallmark of ultimacy experiences. This is a 
consideration for which any grander theory of the causes of ultimacy experiences 
would have to account. 
7.4 The Causes of Udlimacy Experiences 
On the basis of this model of ultimacy experiences, can we say whether in fact 
Ultimacy causes ultimacy experiences? We have been able to speak of ultimacy 
experiences in terms of the density of the semiotic fl'ux we inhabit without having to 
decide whether there is anythmg ultimately corresponding to "ultimacy." That was 
the plan: the usefulness of the model was envisaged to lie not in making claims about 
the causes of ultimacy experiences but in framing questions about such claims. How, 
then, does our model help to frame and evaluate claims about the causes of ultimacy 
experiences? In two ways, we thmk, and we describe them in what follows. 
First, with the background of centuries of futile debate about &vine action in 
mind, we are workmg on the assumption that there is little point in setting up a 
bunch of competitive causal models for ultimacy experiences and then playmg them 
off one another in attempt to make best sense of the data; the odds of success are 
remote at best. The odds of success might be increased, however, ifwe were to use 
the semiotic model as a coordinator of data to aid in selecting among competitive 
causal models of ultimacy experiences. We wouldn't really need the full power of the 
philosophcal semiotic framework to cany h s  off, perhaps, but the model would be 
more useful than its function merely as an inanely overbearing reminder that the best 
explanation has to make sense of all the various perspectives we elaborated in 
sections 2-5. So, how would h s  work? For the sake of simplicity, let us deal with 
h s  question in terms of the action of an intentional divine being, which is one kind 
of &vine action. The positing of action by an intentional divine being in explaining 
the causes of ultimacy experiences occurs frequently in religious and theological 
contexts, whether it be an experience of divine comfort, the sense of the presence of 
Jesus, an unaccountable peace given as divine gift in response to the f a i W  worship 
of Allah, a moment of inspiration that creates or confirms a belief, the hearing of 
divine voices and the seeing of heavenly visions, an event of psychological healing 
following the invocation of the power of God over the natural world, or a process of 
character transformation springing from a sense of divine forgiveness for past 
wrongs. Models affirming and rejecting the intentional divine action thesis would be 
assessed against the other levels of description, such as the neural and the 
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sociobiological. The usual frustratingly slippery questions would emerge. Is the 
theological account consistent with the other insights? Must the theological account 
be deemed merely the higher-order, heavily coded description within a specialized 
semiotic environment for an experience that is more adequately described in other 
terms (say, psychological and neura ldr  Madhyamaka Buddhist, for that matter)? 
It might seem that the semiotic model takes us no further than did the ordinary 
demand that successll models should account for all of the perspectives on ultimacy 
experiences organized in the descriptive taxonomy-the phenomenological, the 
neural, the social-psychological, and the theological-ethical. But that is not quite the 
case. W l e  the semiotic model does not stipulate strict rules for answering questions 
about which description of the causes of an ultimacy experience is true or more 
accurate, it does impact the process of debate in three helpful ways. First, all 
canddate accounts of the actual causes of ultimacy experiences would have to be 
able to explain the fundamental datum of the structured pattern of sign transforma- 
tions described in our model (again, refer to Diagram 2 in Appendix B for a 
summary of that structure)-thls is, in effect, a new and sturdy constraint on models. 
Second, the model's neutrality to questionsof causal provenance and truth facilitates 
its usefulness for conducting debates among experts with very Merent views about 
the reality of divine action. People can discuss their models in a common language 
without simply repeatedly stumbling over the conflicting presuppositions of their 
explanations. Finally, the model's foundation of detailed, integrated descriptions of 
ultimacy experiences establishes an important criterion for debate among competi- 
tive accounts: the canddate explanations have to demonstrate their compatibility 
with all of the various levels of description. It is not acceptable for candidates merely 
to assert their compatibility with the various levels of description, nor is it possible 
without penalty to withdraw fiom the debate for fear of being uncompetitive. The 
critically realist emphasis in the model's philosophical-semiotic fiamework implies 
a common referent of the various sign-descriptions, even when those descriptions 
are fiom diverse social-linguistic contexts. The bland assertion of compatibility by 
virtue of some perspectival move-"they see it their way, we see it our way"-is, 
accordingly, unintelligible or indistinguishable fiom mere w i s W  thinlung. If such 
perspectival compatibility actually obtains, then the semiotic fiamework implies that 
it can be explained in detail, at least to some degree. 
These three contributions mark a modest but real advance in conducting debates 
about the causes of ultimacy experiences. These debates, we must remember, may 
in fact be irresolvable-to return to the image used above, we may simply be 
refwbishing the art gallery's decor with the switch to philosophical-semiotic 
conceptuality. We cannot determine that in advance, however, so it is as well to have 
a relatively neutral and data-rich h e w o r k  within which to conduct such debates 
and a slightly enlarged set of criteria to which appeal may be made in dstinguishmg 
mferior from superior causal models of ultimacy  experience^.'^^ 
' I 0  Note that these constraints apply to all theories of divine action in relation to human 
experience, of which this volume contains a number. For example, concepts such as whole- 
part causation or primary-secondary causation are invoked in various places to express how 
God's action might be compatible with other descriptions of ultimacy experiences. We judge 
such speculative concepts to be an advance over the mere rcdescription of the problem in 
terms of such concepts & supcmenience, as usually defined. (gut s e e ~ a n c e ~  ~ u a h ~ ' s  essay
in this volume in which she promises more on behalf of her definition of suvervenience than 
merely the potential for reddscribing an established problem.) However, o;r model not only 
invites such speculative attempts to demonstrate the compatibility of a few levels of 
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In connection with this, we note that the challenge of reductionism that threatens 
to make superfluous God-descriptions of the provenance of ultimacy experiences is 
made neither harder nor easier by our model, but merely is posed happily. With all 
of the levels of description in place, the full complexity of the problem of reduction- 
ism can be appreciated: it is nothing other than the problem of intelligibly 
coordinating the various levels of descriptions of ultimacy experiences that our 
model incorporates. And that problem must be pursued using a variety of strategies. 
We shall not venture far into thls territory but we do make the following suggestion. 
Centralizing the concept of engagement in the semiotic underpinnings of our model 
sh~fts the burden of proof in the reductionism debate by bluntly demanding that all 
parties pay careful attention to all data relevant to the task of describing that which 
is engaged and the means by which it is engaged. There is no question in our minds 
that neglect of relevant data is one of the crimes perpetrated by the hasty assumption 
of unjustifiably reductive accounts of religious experiences (and there is more than 
one way to be hastily reductive!). 
The second way of bringing our semiotic model to bear on the evaluation of 
causal models is, we think, far more interesting. Were it not for this second way, we 
would not have bothered with all of the philosophical-semiotic overhead. The 
starting point is to notice that the semiotic model is not a causal model. Rather, it is 
vaguer than traditional causal models in an important respect. Yet it stays close to 
the data, making it empirically more responsible than traditional causal models of 
religious experience. This strategy of developing an empirical model that remains 
vague about ontology is a deliberate attempt to fit the model to the lines of debate, 
making it vague where the debate seems least tractable and highly specific where the 
debate seems to promise the clearest answers. The result is the plotting of a course 
around the edge of the untraversable ontological swamps, all the whle staying on the 
solid ground of relatively uncontroversial data. In short, pursuing this strategy 
delegitimates debates about whether or not real contact with some sort of Ultimate 
occurs in religious experiences. In exchange, there is an emphasis on the issue of 
whether that which is actually engaged in ultimacy experiences supports assertions 
made about ultimacy in theological accounts. For example, is that which is actually 
engaged in ultimacy experiences rightly described as a personal God, as a 
mysterious natural force, as the hangover of childhood developmental frustrations, 
or as a meaningless artifact of temporal lobe transients? This is by no means an easy 
problem but it is a far ddTerent and more interesting problem than the irresolvable 
and often data-censoring debates about reductionism in relation to religious 
experiences. It clumps all the intractable ontological questions into one comer whle 
organizing ways of answering the more resolvable questions. Thls approach even 
sets up an environment for dealing with ontological debates in a systematic, 
comparative way-and there is no question that systematic comparative metaphysics 
will be the venue for the best of such debates in our era of multicultural awareness. 
The key to the effectiveness of the philosophical-semiotic model is the fact that it is 
vague in all the right places. We indicate below (section 7.6) the sorts of specula- 
tions that we think our model permits when it is used to interpret ultimacy 
experiences on its own terms rather than being limited to playing referee for 
description; it also insists that all of the various levels of descriptions are registered in any 
theoretical portrayal of their compatibility and resists the mere assertion of compatibility of 
those levels of descriptions. 
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competing causal models in the traditional but futile game of deciding if a &vine 
being ever intentionally does anythmg in particular. 
7.5 The Value of Lntimacy Experiences 
Once the whole array of pertinent data is allowed to have its effect on the interpreta- 
tion ofultimacy experiences, rather than a subset of it determined by the unreflective 
or ideological embrace of reductionistic assumptions, a balanced discussion of the 
value of ultimacy experiences is possible. Admttedly, the theological problems 
posed by a model such as ours are no easier to manage just because the data set is 
richer, as we pointed out above. Theological claims about the value of ultimacy 
experiences are easy to contest, accordingly. In several other respects, however, the 
value of ultimacy experiences is easier to make out. 
First, the transformative efficacy and sheer emotional color of ultirnacy 
experiences makes them valuable. People often change their lives dramatically 
because of ultimacy experiences, almost always in the direction of greater 
contentment and emotional maturity. What reams of argumentation and hosts of 
exemplars are often powerless to achleve, ultimacy experiences can induce almost 
instantaneously. The data confirm this resoundingly. 
Second and more abstractly, the semiotic density expressed in the having and in 
the social meaning of ultimacy experiences indicates that the environment of human 
life is astonishingly rich. Indeed, it is rich enough to make ultimacy experiences 
important and maybe necessary reminders of how quick we are to oversimplify our 
lives, to trim the interest, to dull the color. And to what end? Ultimacy experiences 
drive into awareness our tendency to flatten out our life for the sake of the comfort 
of predictability and the appearance of safety; this awareness helps us to become 
more realistic and adaptable. 
Thud, and connected with this, ultimacy experiences are valuable interruptions 
of the socially programed character of much of our lives. The legitimation structures 
of society aim for pacific steadiness in all social transactions, in the name of 
controlling our intriguing environment. But ultimacy experiences are capable of 
casting social transactions into new and perhaps uncomfortably bright light. They 
relativize social norms and assumptions in such a way as to open up space for 
critique. As a result, ultimacy experiences time and again have been wellsprings of 
transformation and reform. Unfortunately, they have also been the triggering events 
for violence and enthusiastic neglect of important balancing perspectives. But that 
there is a positive side at all to the social effects of ultimacy experiences indicates a 
notable virtue. 
All ofthese benefits are incontestable-at least fiom all but the most obscure and 
anti-social perspectives-no matter how mistaken the interpretations attached to the 
causes and theological significance of ultimacy experiences may finally prove to be. 
But none ofthese virtues is even discernible unless explanations of the extraordinary 
richness of life that is expressed in ultimacy experiences prize fidelity to the data to 
be explained, a scientific virtue too often neglected in the study of religious 
experiences. 
7.6 One V i  of Lrmimacy and Lntimacy Experiences 
We began with neutral description of ultimacy experiences and ended with a model 
capable of neutrally framing debate about the actual causes of ultimacy experiences. 
We just now let our hair down a little and argued that ultimacy experiences are 
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valuable in important ways even iftheological theories about their origm and nature 
prove to be mistaken. In concluding we shall throw caution to the wind and offer a 
modest suggestion about what the Ultimacy really is that we actually engage in 
ultimacy experiences. That a psychologist-neurologist and a philosopher-theologian 
are capable of agreeing on something like this is remarkable, to us at least, but it just 
so happens that we do agree and so we take a moment here to express our 
considered opinion. 
We have said that the world shows up as something in particular in our 
engagement with it and, therefore, that Ultimacy is really showing up in ultimacy 
experiences. The manner ofUltimacy's showing-up is a spectacularly rich and dense 
pattern of sign transformation that links enormous amounts of our experience 
together and brings mutually enrichg sigdicance to them all. We have said that 
this may be explicable in many ways, but we have resolutely rejected tlunly reductive 
accounts that deny such rich density of meanings; they are insufficiently empirical 
and, by leaving out the good stuff, commit the sin of being boring. That leaves us 
with a wondrous world, as monstrously temfymg at some times as it is blissfully 
peaceful at others. And our aim is to say what sort of Ultimate lies b e h d  these 
astonishing ways thatultimacy shows up for us. We know what Buddhism says about 
h s ,  by and large: there is nothing lying behind this showing-up of ultimacy; the 
point is to journey on an ultimate path toward enlightened acceptance of the world 
in its wondrous actuality. We know what serious theisms say about it, too: God in 
various conceptions is what shows up in this most amazing way and God is even 
more temfying and wonderful than ultimacy experiences suggest. We even know 
what serious forms of evolutionary naturalism say about it: nature, needing no 
creator being and subject to no ultimate purpose, is richer and more wondrous than 
we can imagine; all we experience so far is what our evolved neural and social 
capacities enable us to register-it only gets more intense. 
We think that each of these three is roughly correct about what it &s and 
insufticiently imaginative about what it denies. The evolutionary naturalists and the 
Buddhists will forever disagree over nature but the former are right about the 
evolutionary preconditions for our current state and the latter are right about the 
importance of a path in whlch enlightened acceptance of the wonders and challenges 
of life is prized. Neither group tends to have much sympathy for any sort of theism, 
but that may be because theists typically speak about God in ways that needlessly 
conflict with the insights of evolutionary naturalists and Buddhists. The mystics of 
theistic traditions do not make that mistake, however. They describe an Ultimate that 
defies all descriptions, whether as physical nature, as a divine being, or as a path of 
enlightenment. Our social and neural capabilities presumably allow us  only primitive 
forms of engagement with this most profound mystery even now. After all, it must 
be as subtle and profound as the creative potential of nature. When in the process of 
evolutionary development this mystery began to be consciously perceived in a rich 
flux of sign transformations, it is probable both that social-linguistic systems already 
existed that were capable of expressing that encounter to some extent and that these 
experiences forced adaptations inthose social-linguistic systems. Even at their most 
sophisticated, however, social-linguistic expression of ultimacy experiences has 
always and only been from a particular point of view. If simple flowers and complex 
personal relationships defy systematic description, then how much more will our 
descriptions of Ultimacy refract into uncountably many perspectives? This Ultimate 
is the power of being in one conceptuality, a morally unfamiliar drive for enrichment 
and complexity in another, and a passionate lover all-consuming in its demands in 
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yet another. None of these descriptions will do, yet the stirrings in the mysterious 
depths of reality continue to leave traces in the semiotic flux we inhabit and 
especially in ultimacy experiences. We can no more remain silent about ths  
enormous strangeness than we can undo the evolutionary development that gave us 
the capacity for subjectivity, sociality, culture, language, and rich intensity of 
meaning.'21 
Religion is right at a deeper level than most of its theological claims and some 
of it practices suggest: there is something out there and in here. We think many 
scientists sense the same thing in studying the wonders of nature, even when they 
elect not to use religious categories in describing those wonders.lZ2 This ultimate 
something that we sense in the depths of nature is not much like a personal God. It 
is not a causal force independent of the rest of nature. It does not reflect human moral 
categories very closely. It is not especially amenable to cognitive investigation 
because inquiry quickly trips up on the phenomenon of conceptual refraction 
described above. It is not even much like a being. And yet it is not nothing, either, 
even if Buddhists are right to say that it is somehow indeterminate or empty. It is 
real, and it is doubtless more wondrous and strange than our best and worst guesses. 
This is the hypothesis that best makes sense of the basic data, including the data of 
religious experience. It is a proposal vague in the right way and one with which more 
elaborated theories of Ultimacy (such as doctrines of God and divine action) should 
strive to be consistent. It is a modest hypothesis, metaphysically minimalist, realistic 
about the conflicting descriptions of Ultimacy found in the theological claims of 
religious groups, and bearing little resemblance to folk religious ideas. But it is a 
powerful idea, well attested by mystical traditions worldwide, as congenial to the 
natural and social sciences as it is to religion, and well matched to the amazing facet 
of human life that we call uliimacy experiences. 
"I There a n  obvious ways to extend this view in the direction of religiously and 
philosophically viable versions of naturalism. A number of recent books advocate such forms 
of religious naturalism. For example, see Charley Hardwick, Events of Grace: Naturalism, 
Existentialism, and Theology (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1996); 
Gordon D. Kaufman, In Face of Mystery: A Constructive Theology (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1993); and Robert Cummings Neville, The Truth ofBmken Symbols. 
12' For a recent example of this, see Ursula Goodenough, The Sacred Depths of Nature 
(New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
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Appendix A: Reader's Guide 
Introduction (section 1) 
Describing Ultimacy Experiences (sections 2-5) 
Phenomenology: A Taxonomy of Ultimacy Experiences (section 2) 
>> Discrete Ultimacy Experiences (2.1-2.3) 
EZements ofDiscrete UEx (2.3): sensory alterations, selfaltcrationr. presences. cognitions, 
motions 
>> Extended Ultimacy Experiences (2.4-2.6) 
>> Social Ultimacy Experiences (2.4) 
>> Transformative Ultimacy Experiences (2.5) 
Elements of &tended VEX (2.6): cxistmtial potency, social mbeddmg transformation of 
behavior, transformation ofpemnality. transformation of beliefs 
Neurology: Some ~ x ~ l a n a t o j  ~ersp&tives (section 3) 
>> Neurological Part-Model (3.1) 
>> P h c  1 : N d  Expression-Activation 
>> P h e  2: Neural Expression-Quality 
>> Phare 3: Social-Linguistic Conditioning 
>> Classes of Supporting Data (3.2-3.6) 
>> T e m w  lobc epilepsy (3.2) 
>> Semantic processing of discrete expericncu (3.3) 
>> Alteratiom of penon experience (3.4) 
>> Chronic personality clump and temporal lobe patholo~y (3.5) 
>> Neurological mnr~derationr elevant to scelal~ty (3 6) 
Social Psychology: Some Explanatory Perspectives (section 4) 
>> Psychoanalysis (4.1) 
>> Early dmlopment 
>> Subject and object 
>> Spiritual guide 
>> Discernment 
>> Role of an c a d  force or power 
>> Experience of lmr of sclf 
>> Life-Stage Psychology (4.2) 
>> Adult development 
>> Spiritual development 
>> Death 
>> Evolutionary Psychology (4.3) 
Theology and Ethics: Some Explanatory Perspectives (section 5) 
>> Theological concepts and narratives (5.1) 
>> Ethical concepts and narratives (5.2) 
>> Expressing experiences of ultimacy in language (5.3) 
>> Spiritual discernment (5.4) 
Fbcedm for Identifying Typical and Authentic Ultimacy Expeliences (section 6) 
Identifjnng Typical Ultimacy Experiences (6.1-6.2) 
>> Summary of the description of ultimacy experiences (6.1) 
>> Using the description to identify typical ultimacy experiences (6.2) 
Identifjnng Authentic Ultimacy Experiences (6.3) 
The Importance of an Orientation to the Future (6.4) 
The Causes and Value of Ultimacy Experiences (section 7) 
The Problem with Modeling Causes (7.1) 
Philosophical-Semiotic Model (7.2-7.3) 
>> Philosophical-semiotic framework for the model (7.2) 
>> A causal model that traces sign transformations (7.3) 
Applying the Model (7.4-7.5) 
>> On the causes of ultimacy experiences (7.4) 
>> On the value of ultimacy experiences (7.5) 
A Speculative Conclusion (7.6) 
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Appendix B: Diagrams 
Diagram 1 .  Identeing the Target Group-Ultimacy Experiences 
(1) Ultimacy experiences include much of what people usually describe as 
"religious experiences" but also other experiences not usually described as 
"religious." (2 )  Several sorts of markers help to identify the various types of 
ultimacy experiences. (3) Purported instances of ultimacy experiences approxi- 
mate the ideal types to greater and lesser degrees (represented by the targets 
at the center of each type in the taxonomy). 
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Diagram 2. The Structure o f  Sign Transformations in Ultimacy Experiences 
(1) Sign transformations (represented by arrows) flood back and forth among 
indMdual sub)ect'~ities, social contexts, and brains. (2 )  Sign transformations are 
greater in number in ultimacy experiences than in ordinary experiences 
(represented by arrows deeper into the emergent structure of human 
experience). (3) This binds all three domains together more richly and intensely, 
enabling deeper reaches of reality to be registered, in ways that are (a) difficult 
to express cognitively, and (b) frequently tansformative in their effects. (4) 
These are structural features of causal taces (sign Vansformations), not causes 
themselves. Hypotheses about the actual causes of ultimacy experiences must 
account for these structural features. 
